RESPONSE TO GCIO CLOUD COMPUTING INFORMATION SECURITY & PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS

Microsoft Azure

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Executive Summary

In 2014 the NZ Government Chief Information Officer published a due diligence framework for agencies to use in evaluating cloud computing services. This document provides Microsoft's responses to the questions in that framework in relation to Microsoft Azure.

The document is the first in a series of such documents that Microsoft New Zealand will produce covering many of Microsoft's cloud services.

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How to read this document

The document breaks the 105 due diligence questions (the "considerations") into their sub-sections as per the source document, and records Microsoft's understanding of who is responsible for responding to each question. It repeats the text in the source document and then provides the most appropriate and detailed answer possible to each question where Microsoft has sole or joint responsibility to respond. No responses to questions 1-13 are provided, as these are the sole responsibility of agencies to answer.

In some cases where it may be helpful to users of this document, Microsoft has provided a response to questions where it has no responsibility to do so.

Readers should note that, while the document should be helpful to both public and private sector organisations that are considering using Microsoft Azure, it has been drafted with the needs of public sector organisations being of foremost importance.

Readers should also note that some of the answers are drafted on the assumption that the organisation making use of this document is an "Eligible Agency" under the terms of the Microsoft G2012 all-of-government agreement that is in place with the Department of Internal Affairs with the New Zealand Government.

Security and Privacy Considerations

This section describes the core considerations for any agency planning a deployment of a cloud computing service. Each area is described in some detail followed by a list of key considerations to assist agencies in developing an assessment of their risk position for a proposed service.

3.1 Value, Criticality and Sensitivity of Information

In order to be able to assess the risks associated with using a cloud service, agencies must recognise the value, criticality and sensitivity of the information they intend to place in the service.

Agencies are required to classify official information in accordance with the guidance published in 'Security in the Government Sector 2002 (SIGS)'. They are also required to protect official information in line with the guidance published in the 'New Zealand Information Security Manual (NZISM)'.

The under-classification of data could result in official information being placed in a cloud service that does not have appropriate security controls in place and therefore cannot provide an adequate level of protection. Conversely, over-classification could lead to unnecessary controls being specified leading to excessive costs resulting in suitable cloud services being rejected. Therefore, it is critical that an agency accurately assesses the value, criticality and sensitivity of its data, and correctly classifies it to ensure that it is appropriately protected.

Consideration	Respondent
1. Who is the business owner of the information?	Customer
2. What are the business processes that are supported by the information?	Customer
3. What is the security classification of the information based on the NZ government guidelines for protection of official information?	Customer
4. Are there any specific concerns related to the confidentiality of the information that will be stored or processed by the cloud service?	Customer
5. Does the data include any personal information?	Customer
6. Who are the users of the information?	Customer
7. What permissions do the users require to the information? (i.e. read, write, modify and/or delete)	Customer
8. What legislation applies to the information? (e.g. Privacy Act 1993, Official Information Act 1982, Public Records Act 2005)	Customer
9. What contractual obligations apply to the information? (e.g. Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS))	Customer
10. What would the impact on the business be if the information was disclosed in an unauthorised manner?	Customer
11. What would the impact on the business be if the integrity of the information was compromised?	Customer
12. Does the agency have incident response and management plans in place to minimise the impact of an unauthorised disclosure?	Customer
13. What would the impact on the business be if the information were unavailable?	
a. What is the maximum amount of data loss that can be tolerated after a disruption has occurred? This is used to define the Recovery Point Objective.	Customer
b. What is the maximum period of time before which the minimum levels of services must be restored after a disruption has occurred? This is used to define the Recovery Time Objective.	Customer
c. What is the maximum period of time before which the full service must be restored to avoid permanently compromising the business objectives? This is used to define the Acceptable Interruption Window.	Customer

3.2 Data Sovereignty

The use of cloud services located outside of New Zealand's jurisdiction, or owned by foreign companies, introduces data sovereignty risks. This means that any data stored, processed or transmitted by the service may be subject to legislation and regulation in those countries through which data is stored, processed and transmitted. Similarly, a foreign owned service provider operating a service within New Zealand may be subject to the laws of the country where its registered head offices are located.

The laws that could be used to access information held by the service provider vary from country to country. In some instances, when a service provider is compelled by a foreign law enforcement agency to provide data belonging to their customers, they may be legally prohibited from notifying the customer of the request. Therefore, it is critical that an agency identify the legal jurisdictions in which its data will be stored, processed or transmitted. Further, they should also understand how the laws of those countries could impact the confidentiality, integrity, availability and privacy of the information.

If the service provider outsources or sub-contracts any aspect of the delivery of the service to a third-party, agencies must also identify whether this introduces additional data sovereignty risks.

Privacy information that is held in legal jurisdictions outside of New Zealand may be subject to the privacy and data protection laws of the countries where the cloud service is delivered. Privacy and data protection laws can vary considerably from country to country. Therefore, it is important that agencies assess how the laws of those countries could affect the privacy of their employees and/or customers' information.

Considerations	Respondent
14. Where is the registered head office of the service provider?	Microsoft
15. Which countries are the cloud services delivered from?	Microsoft
16. In which legal jurisdictions will the agency's data be stored and processed?	Microsoft
17. Does the service provider allow its customers to specify the locations where their data can and cannot be stored and processed?	Microsoft
18. Does the service have any dependency on any third parties (e.g. outsourcers, subcontractors or another service provider) that introduce additional jurisdictional risks? If yes, ask the service provider to provide the following details for each third party involved in the delivery of the service:	Microsoft
a. The registered head office of the third party;	Microsoft
b. The country or countries that their services are delivered from; and	Microsoft
c. The access that they have to client data stored, processed and transmitted by the cloud service.	Microsoft
19. Have the laws of the country or countries where the data will be stored and processed been reviewed to assess how they could affect the security and/or privacy of the information?	Joint
20. Do the laws actually apply to the service provider and/or its customer's information? (e.g. some privacy laws exempt certain types of businesses or do not apply to the personal information of foreigners.)	Customer
21. Do the applicable privacy laws provide an equivalent, or stronger, level of protection than the Privacy Act 1993? If no, are customers able to negotiate with the service provider to ensure that the equivalent privacy protections are specified in the contract?	Joint
22. How does the service provider deal with requests from government agencies to access customer information?	Microsoft
a. Do they only disclose information in response to a valid court order?	Microsoft
b. Do they inform their customers if they have to disclose information in response to such a request?	Microsoft
c. Are they prevented from informing customers that they have received a court order requesting access to their information?	Microsoft

Once agencies have identified the legal jurisdictions where their data will be held, they should assess whether or not it is appropriate to store their data in the service. This may require them to seek specialist legal and/or security advice. Agencies without access to specialist resources are encouraged to seek advice from the Government Chief Information Officer (GCIO).

Microsoft Responses

14. Where is the registered head office of the service provider?

Microsoft Corporation is headquartered in Redmond, Washington, USA. Microsoft Operations Pte Ltd is the service provider and its registered head office is in Singapore.

15. Which countries are the cloud services delivered from?

Azure is generally available in 24 regions around the world, including two in Australia, and has announced plans for 8 additional regions. These regions are currently grouped into six geos: United States, Europe, Asia Pacific, Australia, Japan and Brazil. An up-to-date list of Azure regions is available here and customers can find an up-to-date list of the services delivered at each region here.

16. In which legal jurisdictions will the agency's data be stored and processed?

Customers may specify the geo and region of the Microsoft datacentres where their data will be stored. Microsoft will not transfer data outside the geo(s) specified by the customer except where necessary for Microsoft to provide customer support, troubleshoot the service, or comply with legal requirements; or where the customer configures the account to enable the transfer of data, including through the use of features that don't enable geo selection or certain other features which may store data globally. A customer can access its data from any geo. Microsoft's Azure datacentres in Australia are a "geo" with "regions" in New South Wales and Victoria.

For more information, see https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/TrustCenter/Privacy/default.aspx

17. Does the service provider allow its customers to specify the locations where their data can and cannot be stored and processed?

Yes - a customer can specify the geo where their data will be stored and Microsoft will not transfer that customer's data outside the geo specified by the customer except in the limited circumstances referred to above in Question 16. Microsoft updates the Azure Trust Centre from time to time with the latest information about Microsoft's geos and regions.

18. Does the service have any dependency on any third parties (e.g. outsourcers, subcontractors or another service provider) that introduce additional jurisdictional risks?

A list of subcontractors is available at any time from the Azure Trust Centre. This document identifies the subcontractors Microsoft uses, the service provided by the subcontractor and the area the subcontractor is from.

If yes, ask the service provider to provide the following details for each third party involved in the delivery of the service:

18a. The registered head office of the third party;

Microsoft does not publish information about the registered head offices of its subcontractors.

18b. The country or countries that their services are delivered from; and

Country of operation is set out in the list of subcontractors Microsoft publishes in the Azure Trust Centre.

18c. The access that they have to client data stored, processed and transmitted by the cloud service.

[Microsoft's Online Service terms (OST)](#) state:

"Use of Subcontractors. Microsoft may hire subcontractors to provide services on its behalf. Any such subcontractors will be permitted to obtain Customer Data only to deliver the services Microsoft has retained them to provide and will be prohibited from using Customer Data for any other purpose. Microsoft remains responsible for its subcontractors' compliance with Microsoft's obligations in the OST. Customer has previously consented to Microsoft's transfer of Customer Data to subcontractors as described in the OST."

In addition, the Privacy section of the Data Processing Terms (DPT) incorporated in the OST states:

"**Subcontractor Transfer**. Any subcontractors to whom Microsoft transfers Customer Data, even those used for storage purposes, will have entered into written agreements with Microsoft that are no less protective than the DPT. Customer has previously consented to Microsoft's transfer of Customer Data to subcontractors as described in the DPT. Except as set forth in the DPT, or as Customer may otherwise authorize, Microsoft will not transfer to any third party (not even for storage purposes) personal data Customer provides to Microsoft through the use of the Online Services. Each Online Service has a website that lists subcontractors that are authorized to access Customer Data. At least 14 days before authorizing any new subcontractor to access Customer Data, Microsoft will update the applicable website and provide Customer with a mechanism to obtain notice of that update. If Customer does not approve of a new subcontractor, then Customer may terminate the affected Online Service without penalty by providing, before the end of the notice period, written notice of termination that includes an explanation of the grounds for non-approval."

19. Have the laws of the country or countries where the data will be stored and processed been reviewed to assess how they could affect the security and/or privacy of the information?

Customers should seek their own legal advice to fully understand the laws of the country where the data will be stored and processed. New Zealand customers may be especially interested in using Azure data centres situated in Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong. In Microsoft's view, the privacy laws in each of those jurisdictions provide similar protections to New Zealand's privacy laws when the privacy laws of the other jurisdictions apply. In addition, with respect to law enforcement requests in those jurisdictions, in Microsoft's view there are appropriate due process requirements in place so as not to present any substantial risk of arbitrary or improper data disclosure requests by law enforcement or other government officials. See also the Compliance with Laws section in the Microsoft Online Services Terms located [here](#).

20. Do the laws actually apply to the service provider and/or its customer's information? (e.g. some privacy laws exempt certain types of businesses or do not apply to the personal information of foreigners.)

Customers should seek their own legal advice to fully understand the laws of the country where the data will be stored and processed. See also the Compliance with Laws section in the Microsoft Online Services Terms located [here](#).

21. Do the applicable privacy laws provide an equivalent, or stronger, level of protection than the Privacy Act 1993?

Customers should seek their own legal advice to fully understand the laws of the country where the data will be stored and processed. New Zealand customers may be especially interested in using Azure data centres situated in Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong. In Microsoft's view, the privacy laws in each of those jurisdictions provide similar protections to New Zealand's privacy laws when the privacy laws of the other jurisdictions apply. See also the Compliance with Laws section in the Microsoft Online Services Terms located [here](#).

21a. If no, are customers able to negotiate with the service provider to ensure that the equivalent privacy protections are specified in the contract?

No. Due to the inherent nature of a multi-tenant public cloud service customers cannot negotiate for specific privacy provisions.

22. How does the service provider deal with requests from government agencies to access customer information?

Microsoft's Online Service terms (OST) state: "**Disclosure of Customer Data**. Microsoft will not disclose Customer Data outside of Microsoft or its controlled subsidiaries and affiliates except (1) as Customer directs, (2) as described in the OST, or (3) as required by law.

Microsoft will not disclose Customer Data to law enforcement unless required by law. If law enforcement contacts Microsoft with a demand for Customer Data, Microsoft will attempt to redirect the law enforcement agency to request that data directly from Customer. If compelled to disclose Customer Data to law enforcement, Microsoft will promptly notify Customer and provide a copy of the demand unless legally prohibited from doing so.

Upon receipt of any other third party request for Customer Data, Microsoft will promptly notify Customer unless prohibited by law. Microsoft will reject the request unless required by law to comply. If the request is valid, Microsoft will attempt to redirect the third party to request the data directly from Customer.

Microsoft will not provide any third party: (a) direct, indirect, blanket or unfettered access to Customer Data; (b) platform encryption keys used to secure Customer Data or the ability to break such encryption; or (c) access to Customer Data if Microsoft is aware that the data is to be used for purposes other than those stated in the third party's request.

In support of the above, Microsoft may provide Customer's basic contact information to the third party."

22a. Do they only disclose information in response to a valid court order?

As stated in Microsoft's Online Services Terms, Microsoft will only disclose information to law enforcement if required to do so by applicable law. We require a court order or warrant before we will consider releasing content. All our Principles, Policies and Practices regarding how we respond to criminal law enforcement requests and other government legal demands we receive for customer data are published here. We recommend that customers fully acquaint themselves with this information.

See also response to question 22 above.

22b. Do they inform their customers if they have to disclose information in response to such a request?

Yes. As set out in Microsoft's Online Services Terms (OST), if law enforcement contacts Microsoft with a demand for Customer Data, Microsoft will attempt to redirect the law enforcement agency to request that data directly from Customer. If compelled to disclose Customer Data to law enforcement, Microsoft will promptly notify Customer and provide a copy of the demand unless legally prohibited from doing so. Upon receipt of any other third party request for Customer Data (such as requests from Customer's end users), Microsoft will promptly notify Customer unless prohibited by law. If Microsoft is not required by law to disclose the Customer Data, Microsoft will reject the request. If the request is valid and Microsoft could be compelled to disclose the requested information, Microsoft will attempt to redirect the third party to request the Customer Data from Customer.

See also response to question 22 above.

22c. Are they prevented from informing customers that they have received a court order requesting access to their information?

In some cases, the terms of the court order may prevent Microsoft from informing customers of the court order. While particular orders may not be published, Microsoft does publish a six-monthly Law Enforcement Transparency Report to report on the number of disclosure requests and disclosures made against those requests. See also response to question 22 above.

3.3 Privacy

Agencies planning to place personal information in a cloud service should perform a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) to ensure that they identify any privacy risks associated with the use of the service together with the controls required to effectively manage them.

Cloud services may make it easier for agencies to take advantage of opportunities to share information. For example, sharing personal information with another agency may be achieved by simply creating user accounts with the appropriate permissions within a SaaS solution rather than having to implement a system-to-system interface to exchange information. Although cloud services have the potential to lower the technical barriers to information sharing, agencies must ensure that they appropriately manage access to personal information and comply with the requirements of the Privacy Act 1993.

Service providers typically use privacy policies to define how they will collect and use personal information about the users of a service. US service provider's privacy policies usually distinguish between Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and non-personal information. However, it is important to note that both are considered personal information under the Privacy Act 1993.

Agencies must carefully review and consider the implications of accepting a service provider's privacy policy.

Considerations	Respondent
23. Does the data that will be stored and processed by the cloud service include personal information as defined in the Privacy Act 19939?	Customer
If no, skip to question 28.	
24. Has a PIA been completed that identifies the privacy risks associated with the use of the cloud service together with the controls required to effectively manage them?	Customer
25. Is the service provider's use of personal information clearly set out in its privacy policy? Is the policy consistent with the agency's business requirements?	Joint
26. Does the service provider notify its customers if their data is accessed by, or disclosed to, an unauthorised party? Does this include providing sufficient information to support cooperation with an investigation by the Privacy Commissioner?	Microsoft
27. Who can the agency, its staff and/or customers complain to if there is a privacy breach?	Microsoft

In addition to this, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) has published guidance for small to medium organisations that are considering placing personal information in a cloud service. Agencies are encouraged to review and ensure that they understand the guidance.

Microsoft Responses

23. Does the data that will be stored and processed by the cloud service include personal information as defined in the Privacy Act 1993?

This question is for customers to answer.

If no, skip to question 28.

24. Has a PIA been completed that identifies the privacy risks associated with the use of the cloud service together with the controls required to effectively manage them?

This question is for customers to answer.

25. Is the service provider's use of personal information clearly set out in its privacy policy? Is the policy consistent with the agency's business requirements?

The Microsoft Online Services Privacy Statement, which applies to Microsoft Azure, is accessible through the privacy section of the Microsoft Azure Trust Centre. The current version of this privacy statement (which is updated from time to time) sets out the following types and uses of information:

Customer Data: used to provide the Services (including troubleshooting, detecting and preventing malware etc.)

Administrator Data: used to complete the customer's requested transactions, administer accounts, improve the Services and detect and prevent fraud.

Payment Data: used to complete customer transactions, as well as for the detection and prevention of fraud.

Support Data: used to provide the support services, resolve your support incident and for training purposes.

Cookies and other information: used for storing users' preferences and settings, for fraud prevention, to authenticate users and to collect operational information about the Services.

In regard to Customer Data, the privacy statement says:

"Customer Data will be used only to provide customer the Online Services including purposes compatible with providing those services. Microsoft will not use Customer Data or derive information from it for any advertising or similar commercial purposes. "Customer Data" means all data, including all text, sound, video, or image files, and software, that are provided to Microsoft by, or on behalf of, you or your end users through use of the Online Service. Customer Data is not Administrator Data, Payment Data or Support Data.

For more information about the features and functionality that enable you and your end users to control Customer Data, please review documentation specific to the service. Microsoft also makes a number of data protection commitments in our customer agreement (see the Online Services Terms or other applicable terms for details)."

Customers may also be interested in reading Microsoft's whitepaper entitled "Protecting Data and Privacy in the Cloud".

25a. Is the service provider's use of personal information clearly set out in its privacy policy?

Yes. Personal information falls within the scope of "Customer Data" which is handled in accordance with the arrangements referenced in the answer to question 25 above. Personal information may also be in the other categories of data, as described in the privacy statement.

26. Does the service provider notify its customers if their data is accessed by, or disclosed to, an unauthorised party?

As set out in the answer to question 22 above, if Microsoft is legally compelled to disclose customer data to law enforcement it will notify the customer unless legally prohibited from doing so.

Otherwise, in regard to any possible instance of unlawful access to Customer Data, Microsoft's Online Service terms (OST) state:

"**Security Incident Notification.**

If Microsoft becomes aware of any unlawful access to any Customer Data stored on Microsoft's equipment or in Microsoft's facilities, or unauthorized access to such equipment or facilities resulting in loss, disclosure,

or alteration of Customer Data (each a "Security Incident"), Microsoft will promptly (1) notify Customer of the Security Incident; (2) investigate the Security Incident and provide Customer with detailed information about the Security Incident; and (3) take reasonable steps to mitigate the effects and to minimize any damage resulting from the Security Incident.

Notification(s) of Security Incidents will be delivered to one or more of Customer's administrators by any means Microsoft selects, including via email. It is Customer's sole responsibility to ensure Customer's administrators maintain accurate contact information on each applicable Online Services portal. Microsoft's obligation to report or respond to a Security Incident under this section is not an acknowledgement by Microsoft of any fault or liability with respect to the Security Incident.

Customer must notify Microsoft promptly about any possible misuse of its accounts or authentication credentials or any security incident related to an Online Service."

Customers may also wish to review the whitepaper entitled "Microsoft Azure Security Response in the Cloud"

26a. Does this include providing sufficient information to support cooperation with an investigation by the Privacy Commissioner?

In regard to provision of sufficient information to support cooperation with an investigation by the Privacy Commissioner, Microsoft's approach to collection of evidence complies with the requirements of ISO 27002:2013, where the relevant Control states:

"The organisation should define and apply procedures for the identification, collection, acquisition and preservation of information, which can serve as evidence."

Accordingly, Microsoft's standard procedures for security incident response require preservation of evidence and recording an auditable log of actions.

Customers should note that, in the context of forensic information, Microsoft will work with a Customer on a case-by-case basis. However, as this is a multi-tenant solution, it cannot provide full and unrestricted access to log file data of the servers and network as that data may include other Customers' information.

As part of the Containment phase of the incident response process the escalation team evaluates the scope and impact of an incident. Although the immediate priority is to ensure the incident is contained and data is safe, in cases where an in-depth investigation is required, content will be collected from the subject systems using best-of-breed forensic software and industry best practices.

In Microsoft's view, the question of whether these measures would provide information that would be sufficient to allow cooperation with an investigation by the Privacy Commissioner can only be answered ex post on a case-by-case basis.

27. Who can the agency, its staff and/or customers complain to if there is a privacy breach?

Microsoft's Online Service terms (OST) state:

"How to Contact Microsoft

If Customer believes that Microsoft is not adhering to its privacy or security commitments, Customer may contact customer support or use Microsoft's Privacy web form. Microsoft's mailing address is:

Microsoft Enterprise Service Privacy
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Also, to report suspected security issues or abuse of Azure, customers can contact the cert.microsoft.com team, which is available 24x7.

3.4 Governance

3.4.1 Terms of Service

Cloud computing is essentially a form of outsourcing and like all outsourcing arrangements, it introduces governance challenges. However, unlike traditional outsourcing models it may not always be possible for customers to fully negotiate all contract terms with the service provider, especially in the case of public cloud services (e.g. Google Apps, Microsoft Office 365, Amazon Web Services).

The primary governance control available to agencies is the service provider's Terms of Service (or contract), the associated Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Key Performance Indicators and metrics demonstrating the service performance. These must be carefully reviewed to ensure that the service can meet the agency's obligations to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of its official information and the privacy of all personally identifiable information it intends to place within it.

To be able to exercise any level of control over the data that is held in the cloud service, agencies must maintain ownership of their data and know how the service provider will use the data when delivering the service. Service providers may use customers' data for their own business purposes (e.g. for generating revenue by presenting targeted advertising to users or collecting and selling statistical data to other organisations). Although the use of customer data is usually limited to consumer rather than enterprise contracts it is important to determine whether the service provider will use the data for any purpose other than the delivery of the service. Therefore, the service provider's Terms of Service must be reviewed to ensure that they clearly define the ownership of data, how it will be used in the delivery of the service and whether the service provider will use it for any purpose other than the delivery of the service.

It is not uncommon for a service provider to rely on components from other service providers. For example, a SaaS service may be hosted on an IaaS offering from a different provider. It is essential to identify any dependencies that the service provider has on third-party services to gain a complete understanding of the risks introduced through the adoption of a service.

Considerations	Respondent
28. Does the service provider negotiate contracts with their customers or must they accept a standard Terms of Service?	Microsoft
29. Does the service provider's Terms of Service and SLA clearly define how the service protects the confidentiality, integrity and availability of official information and the privacy of all personally identifiable information?	Microsoft
30. Does the service provider's Terms of Service specify that the agency will retain ownership of its data?	Microsoft
31. Will the service provider use the data for any purpose other than the delivery of the service?	Microsoft
32. Is the service provider's service dependent on any third-party services?	Microsoft

Microsoft Responses

28. Does the service provider negotiate contracts with their customers or must they accept a standard Terms of Service?

Customers' use of Microsoft Azure services is governed by the terms and conditions of the agreement under which they purchase the services.

For customers who purchase or renew a subscription (including free trials) online from Microsoft, their agreement is the Microsoft Online Subscription Agreement which incorporates the Online Services Terms - see http://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/support/legal/subscription-agreement/?country=nz.

For customers who purchase through an Enterprise Agreement, you can obtain a copy of your agreement by contacting your Microsoft account representative or volume licensing.

Customers should also take note of the G2012 Framework Agreement that Microsoft Operations Pte. Ltd has entered into with the New Zealand Government (contracting through the New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs), under which a customer may be an "Eligible Agency".

29. Does the service provider's Terms of Service and SLA clearly define how the service protects the confidentiality, integrity and availability of official information and the privacy of all personally identifiable information?

Yes. While they do not specifically refer to measures taken to protect "official information" or "personally identifiable information", the Data Processing Terms incorporated into Microsoft's Online Service terms (OST) detail the various steps taken by Microsoft to protect the confidentiality and integrity of data (including, for example, the appointment of security officers, the various independent certifications and detail of the internal processes to protect and maintain data).

Customers will be pleased to know that the Data Processing Terms also include the "Standard Contractual Clauses," pursuant to the European Commission Decision of 5 February 2010 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third countries under the EU Data Protection Directive. Microsoft's implementation of the Standard Contractual Clauses has been endorsed by Data Protection Authorities across the EU as evidenced here: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-document/files/2014/20140402_microsoft.pdf

30. Does the service provider's Terms of Service specify that the agency will retain ownership of its data?

Yes. Microsoft's Online Service terms (OST) state:

"**Use of Customer Data.** Customer Data will be used only to provide Customer the Online Services including purposes compatible with providing those services. Microsoft will not use Customer Data or derive information from it for any advertising or similar commercial purposes. As between the parties, Customer retains all right, title and interest in and to Customer Data. Microsoft acquires no rights in Customer Data, other than the rights Customer grants to Microsoft to provide the Online Services to Customer. This paragraph does not affect Microsoft's rights in software or services Microsoft licenses to Customer."

31. Will the service provider use the data for any purpose other than the delivery of the service?

No. See answer to question 30 above.

Also, customers should note that as part of its certification of compliance with ISO/IEC 27001:2013, Microsoft Azure complies with the requirements of the new standard ISO/IEC 27018:2014 — Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for protection of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) in public clouds acting as PII processors.

ISO/IEC 27018:2014 establishes commonly accepted control objectives, controls and guidelines for implementing measures to protect Personally Identifiable Information (PII) in accordance with the privacy principles in ISO/IEC 29100 for the public cloud computing environment.

In particular, ISO/IEC 27018:2014 specifies guidelines based on ISO/IEC 27002, taking into consideration the regulatory requirements for the protection of PII which might be applicable within the context of the information security risk environment(s) of a provider of public cloud services.

ISO/IEC 27018:2014 is applicable to all types and sizes of organizations, including public and private companies, government entities, and not-for-profit organizations, which provide information processing services as PII processors via cloud computing under contract to other organizations.

The guidelines in ISO/IEC 27018:2014 might also be relevant to organizations acting as PII controllers; however, PII controllers can be subject to additional PII protection legislation, regulations and obligations, not applying to PII processors. ISO/IEC 27018:2014 is not intended to cover such additional obligations.

32. Is the service provider's service dependent on any third-party services?

There are no third-party components or licensed technologies involved in provision of Microsoft Azure. Microsoft does use third party subcontractors to provide limited services on its behalf, such as providing customer support. [Customers can download lists of these subcontractors here](#).

3.4.2 Compliance

The NZISM advises agencies to formally assess and certify that their information systems have been deployed with sufficient controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information they store, process and transmit before accrediting them for use.

As discussed, it may not be possible for customers to negotiate the terms of the contract with a service provider. As a result, an agency may not be able to stipulate any specific security controls to protect its data, or to directly verify that the service provider has sufficient controls in place to protect its data. Even if it is possible to directly verify that a service provider has controls, it may not actually be practical to do so if the service is hosted in a data centre outside New Zealand. Therefore, customers must typically rely on the service provider commissioning a third-party audit.

Agencies need to consider which certifications are useful and relevant, and whether or not they increase their confidence in the service provider's ability to protect their information. It is essential that an agency understand if certification to an internationally recognised standard or framework provides any assurance that the service provider meets its security requirements. For example, the Statement for Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) No. 16 Service Organization Control (SOC) 2 Type II allows the service provider to limit the scope of the audit. Similarly, service providers that are certified as being compliant with the requirements defined in ISO/IEC 27001 are able to define the scope of the audit using a Statement of Applicability. Therefore, agencies need to check exactly what controls are covered by the audit by asking the service provider for a copy of the latest external auditor's report (including the scope or Statement of Applicability), and the results of all recent internal audits.

Access to information related to audits varies amongst service providers. Some are willing to provide customers (including potential customers) with full audit reports under a non-disclosure and confidentiality agreement. Whereas others will only provide the certificate to demonstrate that they have passed the audit. The more transparent the service provider is, the easier it is for agencies to assess if the provider has suitable security practices and controls in place to meet their requirements.

Another potential source of information relating to the security controls that a service provider has in place is the Cloud Security Alliance's Security, Trust & Assurance Register (CSA STAR). The level of assurance provided depends on the level that the service provider has achieved on the CSA's Open Certification Framework (OCF).

The first level is self-assessment. To achieve this, service providers submit a completed Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ) or Cloud Controls Matrix (CMM) report that asserts their compliance with the CSA cloud security controls. While these reports can provide agencies with an insight into the service provider's security controls and practices, the CSA only verifies authenticity of the submission and performs a basic check of the accuracy of its content before adding it to the registry. The CSA does not guarantee the accuracy of any entries. As a result, the fact that a provider is listed on the CSA STAR Self-Assessment is an indication that the provider has sought to assert some level of diligence with a registration body but does not actually provide any assurance that they have adequate security practices or controls in place.

The second levels are CSA STAR Certification and Attestation. To achieve these levels service providers undergo third party auditing by an approved Certification Body. The CSA STAR Certification is based on ISO/IEC 27001 and the controls specified in the CMM. The maturity of the service provider's Information Security Management System (ISMS) is assessed and given a rating (i.e. Bronze, Silver or Gold) if they are found to have adequate processes in place. Similarly, the CSA STAR Attestation is based on SSAE 16 SOC 2 Type II and is supplemented by the criteria defined in the CMM. The service providers are regularly assessed based on the controls that they assert are in place and their description of the service.

The third level is continuous monitoring and assessment of the cloud service's security properties using the CMM and the CSA's Cloud Trust Protocol (CTP). This is currently in development and is not anticipated to be available until 2015. The goal of CSA STAR Continuous is provide on-going assurance about the effectiveness of the service provider's security management practices and controls.

The Institute of Information Technology Practitioners (IITP) has published the New Zealand Cloud Computing Code of Practice11 that provides a standardised method for New Zealand based service providers to voluntarily disclose information about the security of their service(s). The Cloud Code is designed to ensure that service providers are transparent in the positioning of their services to their clients. However, it does not provide any specific assurance that they have adequate security practices or controls in place. Therefore, an agency should only use the Cloud Code for informational purposes and should not rely on it to replace its own due diligence.

When relying on certification performed by another party (e.g. a third-party auditor or another government agency) it is important for agencies to understand the scope and limitations of the certification and to assess whether they need to perform further assurance activities. For example, agencies deploying services on one of the approved government IaaS platforms must perform a certification and accreditation review of the components they implement as part of their project (e.g. guest operating systems and applications).

Considerations	Respondent
33. Does the service provider's Terms of Service allow the agency to directly audit the implementation and management of the security measures that are in place to protect the service and the data held within it?	Microsoft
a. If yes, does this include performing vulnerability scans and penetration testing of the service and the supporting infrastructure?	Microsoft
b. If no, does the service provider undergo formal regular assessment against an internationally recognised information security standard or framework by an independent third-party? (E.g. are they certified as being compliant with ISO/IEC 27001? Have they undergone an ISAE 3402 SOC 2 Type II?)	Microsoft
34. Will the service provider allow the agency to thoroughly review recent audit reports before signing up for service? (E.g. will the service provider provide the Statement of Applicability together with a copy of the full audit reports from their external auditor, and the results of any recent internal audits?)	Microsoft
35. Will the service provider enable potential customers to perform reference checks by providing the contact details of two or more of its current customers?	Microsoft
36. Is there a completed CAIQ or CMM report for the service provider in the CSA STAR?	Microsoft
37. Has the service provider undergone a CSA STAR Certification and/or Attestation? Have they published the outcome of the audit?	Microsoft
38. Has the service provider published a completed Cloud Computing Code of Practice?	Microsoft
39. What additional assurance activities must be performed to complete the certification and accreditation of the cloud service?	Customer

33. Does the service provider's Terms of Service allow the agency to directly audit the implementation and management of the security measures that are in place to protect the service and the data held within it?

No. For operational and security reasons Microsoft does not permit a customer to audit Microsoft's operations directly. Allowing potentially thousands of customers to audit our services would not be a scalable practice and might compromise security and privacy. Microsoft does, however, share its independent audits and certifications. These certifications and audit responses accurately represent how Microsoft obtains and meets its security and compliance objectives, and allow customers to validate Microsoft's commitments to security that Microsoft makes for all its customers.

Customers should note they are of course free to audit their own applications and services deployed in Azure.

33a. If yes, does this include performing vulnerability scans and penetration testing of the service and the supporting infrastructure?

No. Microsoft does, however, conduct regular penetration testing to improve Azure security controls and processes. We understand that security assessment is also an important part of our customers' application development and deployment. Therefore, we have established a policy for customers to carry out authorized penetration testing on their applications hosted in Azure. Because such testing can be indistinguishable from a real attack, it is critical that customers conduct penetration testing only after obtaining approval in advance from Azure Customer Support. Penetration testing must be conducted in accordance with our terms and conditions. Requests for penetration testing should be submitted with a minimum of 7-day advanced notice.

To learn more or to initiate penetration testing, please download the Penetration Testing Approval Form and then contact Azure Customer Support. Customers may also be interested in reading the document entitled "Microsoft Enterprise Cloud Red Teaming".

33b. If no, does the service provider undergo formal regular assessment against an internationally recognised information security standard or framework by an independent third-party? (E.g. are they certified as being compliant with ISO/IEC 27001? Have they undergone an ISAE 3402 SOC 2 Type II?)

Yes. By providing customers with compliant, independently verified cloud services, Microsoft makes it easier for customers to achieve compliance for the infrastructure and applications they run in Azure. Customers can contact their Microsoft account representative to request copies of our audit reports.

Microsoft provides Azure customers with detailed information about our security and compliance programs, including audit reports and compliance packages, to help customers assess our services against their own legal and regulatory requirements. In addition, Microsoft has developed an extensible compliance framework that enables it to design and build services using a single set of controls to speed up and simplify compliance across a diverse set of regulations and rapidly adapt to changes in the regulatory landscape.

ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Audit and Certification

Azure is committed to annual certification against the ISO/IEC 27001:2013, a broad international information security standard. The ISO/IEC 27001:2013 certificate validates that Microsoft has implemented the internationally recognized information security controls defined in this standard, including guidelines and general principles for initiating, implementing, maintaining, and improving information security management within an organization.

The audit included the Information Security Management System (ISMS) for Azure, encompassing infrastructure, development, operations, management, support, and in-scope services. The certificate issued by the British Standards Institution (BSI) is publically available here.

SOC 1 and SOC 2 SSAE 16/ISAE 3402 Attestations

Azure has been audited against the Service Organization Control (SOC) reporting framework for both SOC 1 Type 2 and SOC 2 Type 2. Both reports are available to customers to meet a wide range of US and international auditing requirements.

The SOC 1 Type 2 audit report attests to the design and operating effectiveness of Azure controls. The SOC 2 Type 2 audit included a further examination of Azure controls related to security, availability, and confidentiality. Azure is audited annually to ensure that security controls are maintained.

Audits are conducted in accordance with the Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) No. 16 put forth by the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3402 put forth by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB). In addition, the SOC 2 Type 2 audit included an examination of the Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) from the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA).

The audit included the Information Security Management System (ISMS) for Azure, encompassing infrastructure, development, operations, management, support, and in-scope services. Customers should contact Azure Support (or new customers can contact their account representative) to request a copy of the SOC 1 Type 2 and SOC 2 Type 2 reports for Azure.

Australia - Industry Security Registered Assessors Program (IRAP)

The Information Security Registered Assessors Program (IRAP) is an Australian Signals Directorate (ASD, formerly DSD) initiative to provide high quality information and communications technology (ICT) services to government in support of Australia's security. Microsoft Azure is the first and only public cloud service to provide this level of security assurance in Australia.

The IRAP Letter of compliance can be downloaded here.

European Union Safe Harbour

Microsoft (including, for this purpose, all of our US subsidiaries) is Safe Harbour certified under the US Department of Commerce. The underlying law is the European Commission Decision 2000/520/EC on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles. In addition to the EU Member States, members of the European Economic Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) also recognize organizations certified under the Safe Harbour program as providing adequate privacy protection to justify trans-border transfers from their countries to the US. Switzerland has a nearly identical agreement ("Swiss-US Safe Harbour") with the US Department of Commerce to legitimize transfers from Switzerland to the US, to which Microsoft has also certified.

The Safe Harbour certification allows for the legal transfer of E.U. personal data outside E.U. to Microsoft for processing. Under the E.U. Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), which sets a baseline for handling personal data in the EU, Microsoft acts as the data processor, whereas the customer is the data controller with the final ownership of the data and responsibility under the law for making sure that data can be legally transferred to Microsoft. It is important to note that Microsoft will transfer E.U. Customer Data outside the E.U. only under very limited circumstances.

European Union Model Contract Clauses (EUMC)

EU Model Clauses are contractual addendums offered to EU customers requiring additional safeguards for the protection of personal data beyond Safe Harbour Framework. The underlying law is the European

Commission Decision 2010/87/EU on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data under the EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC). Model Clauses include additional security and notice requirements that a cloud service provider is willing to contractually commit to in order to support customers. When included in service agreements with data processors, the Model Clauses assure customers that appropriate steps have been taken to help safeguard personal data, even if data is stored in a cloud-based service centre located outside the European Union.

The European Union's data protection authorities have found that Microsoft's enterprise cloud contracts meet the high standards of EU privacy law. This ensures that our customers can use Microsoft services to move data freely through our cloud from Europe to the rest of the world. Via Microsoft's Online Service Terms (OST) we expand these legal protections to benefit all of our enterprise customers around the world.

The EU's 28 data protection authorities have acted through their "Article 29 Working Party" to provide this approval via a joint letter. Importantly, Microsoft is the first – and so far the only – company to receive this approval. This recognition applies to Microsoft's enterprise cloud services – in particular, Microsoft Azure, Office 365, Microsoft Dynamics CRM and Windows Intune.

Additional compliance

In addition to the above, Microsoft Azure has been audited, accredited, or otherwise meets the requirements of:

- The CSA Cloud Controls Matrix v1.2
- Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP)/ Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)
- Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standards (DSS) Level 1
- United Kingdom G-Cloud OFFICIAL Accreditation
- Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Business Associate Agreement (BAA)
- Life Sciences GxP Compliance
- Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)
- Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)
- USA Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS)

Details regarding Microsoft Azure compliance can be found here.

34. Will the service provider allow the agency to thoroughly review recent audit reports before signing up for service? (E.g. will the service provider provide the Statement of Applicability together with a copy of the full audit reports from their external auditor, and the results of any recent internal audits?)

Customers can use the Service Trust Portal feature included in the Microsoft Trust Center to obtain copies of the ISO, SOC 1 Type 2 and SOC 2 Type 2 external audit reports for Azure. Customers should note that Microsoft does not disclose internal audit results.

35. Will the service provider enable potential customers to perform reference checks by providing the contact details of two or more of its current customers?

Yes. Microsoft provides for reference check opportunities. Please contact your account representative for more information.

36. Is there a completed CAIQ or CMM report for the service provider in the CSA STAR?

Yes. As an "Executive Member" of the CSA, Microsoft Azure has published a self-assessment in relation to the CSA STAR, CCM. A copy can be downloaded here.

37. Has the service provider undergone a CSA STAR Certification and/or Attestation? Have they published the outcome of the audit?

No. However, Azure has been audited against the Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) established by the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA). The audit was completed as part of the SOC 2 Type 2 assessment, the details of which are included in that report. This combined approach is recommended by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and CSA as a means of meeting the assurance and reporting needs of the majority cloud services users.

37a. Have they published the outcome of the audit?

The CSA CCM is designed to provide fundamental security principles to guide cloud vendors and to assist prospective customers in assessing the overall security risk of a cloud provider. By having completed an assessment against the CCM, Azure offers transparency into how its security controls are designed and managed with verification by an expert, independent audit firm.

Detailed information about how Azure fulfils the security, privacy, compliance, and risk management requirements defined in the CCM is published in the CSA's Security Trust and Assurance Registry (STAR) (see: https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/star-registrant/microsoft-windows-azure/). A detailed paper discussing Azure's compliance with the specific controls in the CCM can be found here.

In addition, the paper entitled Microsoft Approach to Cloud Transparency provides an overview of how it addresses various risk, governance, and information security frameworks and standards, including the CSA CCM.

38. Has the service provider published a completed Cloud Computing Code of Practice?

No. As a global provider of public cloud services it is not feasible for Microsoft to become a signatory to the NZ Cloud Computing Code of Practice ("the Code"). Even if it were, due to the existing Privacy, Security and Compliance frameworks Microsoft already adheres to on a global basis, we do not believe becoming a signatory to the Code would add any benefit to its customers.

39. What additional assurance activities must be performed to complete the certification and accreditation of the cloud service?

This question is for customers to answer.

3.5 Confidentiality

There are many factors that may lead to unauthorised access to, or the disclosure of, information stored in a cloud service. However, it is important to note that the vast majority of these are not unique to cloud computing.

As highlighted in Figure 1 the cloud service model (i.e. IaaS, PaaS or SaaS) will determine which party is responsible for implementing and managing the controls to protect the confidentiality of the information stored, processed or transmitted by the service. Similarly, the cloud deployment model (i.e. public, private, community or hybrid) will affect a customer's ability to dictate its control requirements.


Figure 1

3.5.1 Authentication and Access Control

An agency may find that as its use of cloud services increases so will the identity management overhead. The adoption of multiple cloud services may place an unacceptable burden on users if the agency does not have an appropriate identity management strategy. For example, each cloud service that is adopted could result in users requiring another username and password. A discussion of the approaches to identity management is beyond the scope of this document. However, agencies are encouraged to develop an approach to identity and access management that supports their adoption of cloud services, by both their employees and customers. This should include consideration of the security implications and risks.

The broad network access characteristic of cloud computing amplifies the need for agencies to have strong identity lifecycle management practices. This is because users can typically access the information held in a cloud service from any location, which could present a significant risk as employees or contractors may still be able access the service after they have ceased to be employed. Therefore agencies should maintain a robust process for managing the lifecycle of identities that ensures:

- Permissions are approved at the appropriate level within the organisation.
- Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is sufficiently granular to control permissions.
- Users are only granted the permissions they require to perform their duties.
- Users do not accumulate permissions when they change roles within the organisation.
- User accounts are removed in a timely manner when employment is terminated.

In addition, agencies should regularly audit user accounts and the permissions granted to the accounts within the cloud services they have adopted to ensure that redundant accounts are removed and that users continue to only be granted the permissions they require to perform their duties.

Ubiquitous access also means that users can access the information held in the cloud service from any location using many different devices. Agencies must carefully consider the associated information security implications and assess what controls are required to adequately protect their information. For example, an agency adopting a SaaS based Customer Relationship Management (CRM) solution may determine that it needs to restrict access to specific features and functionality (e.g. downloading customer records or saving reports) when users access the service from outside the agency's premises or using a non-agency owned and managed device.

Another area of concern when adopting cloud services is whether passwords provide a sufficient level of assurance that the person authenticating to the service is the owner of the user account. Agencies must determine whether they require a stronger authentication mechanism (e.g. multifactor authentication) that provides sufficient confidence that the party asserting the identity is the authorised user.

Considerations	Respondent
40. Does the agency have an identity management strategy that supports the adoption of cloud services? If yes, does the cloud service support the agency's identity management strategy?	Joint
41. Is there an effective internal process that ensures that identities are managed throughout their lifecycle?	Joint
42. Is there an effective audit process that is actioned at regular intervals to ensure that user accounts are appropriately managed?	Joint
43. Have the controls required to manage the risks associated with the ubiquitous access provided by the cloud been identified?	Joint
44. Does the cloud service meet those control requirements?	Customer
45. Is there a higher level of assurance required that the party asserting an identity is the authorised user of the account when authenticating to the service? (I.e. is multi-factor authentication necessary?)	Joint

Microsoft Responses

40. Does the agency have an identity management strategy that supports the adoption of cloud services? If yes, does the cloud service support the agency's identity management strategy?

In regard to Microsoft Azure's support for customers' identity management strategies, Azure Active Directory enables customers to manage access to Azure. Multi-Factor Authentication and access monitoring services offer enhanced security.

Beyond this, in regard to the Azure service/platform itself, Microsoft implements a comprehensive range of identity and access controls required under ISO/IEC 27002:2013 *Information technology -- Security techniques -- Code of Practice for Information Security Controls*. Details of these controls can be shared under NDA. Customers should note that they still retain their own responsibilities to apply appropriate identity management controls on top of those that Microsoft provides at the Azure service/platform level.

40a. If yes, does the cloud service support the agency's identity management strategy?

This question is for customers to answer.

41. Is there an effective internal process that ensures that identities are managed throughout their lifecycle?

In regard to Microsoft's internal identity management practices, customers are advised to review the document entitled "Microsoft Azure Standard Response to RFI - Privacy and Security". Specifically, customer should note the following responses:

• **SA-02: Security Architecture - User ID Credentials**

Password policies for corporate domain accounts are managed through Microsoft corporate Active Directory policy that specifies minimum requirements for password length, complexity and expiry. The temporary passwords are communicated to the users using MSIT established processes.

All services and infrastructure must at a minimum meet MSIT requirements but an internal organization can increase the strength past this standard, on their own discretion and to meet their security needs.

Customers are responsible for keeping passwords from being disclosed to unauthorized parties and for choosing passwords with sufficient entropy as to be effectively non-guessable.

"User password management and user registration" is covered under the ISO 27001 standards, specifically addressed in Annex A, domains 11.2.1 and 11.2.3. For more information, review of the publicly available ISO standards we are certified against is suggested."

• **SA-07: Security Architecture - Shared Networks**

Access to the Microsoft Azure production environments by staff and contractors is tightly controlled.

• Terminal Services servers are configured to use the high encryption setting.

• Microsoft Azure requires 2 Factor Authentication to access networking –level components (RSA, SecurID) and users connecting to the Microsoft Corporate Network remotely (and then to Azure) use Direct Access which relies on 2 Factor Authentication to setup.

"Microsoft User authentication for external connections" is covered under the ISO 27001 standards, specifically addressed in Annex A, domain 11.4.2. For more information, review of the publicly available ISO standards we are certified against is suggested.

• **SA-11: Security Architecture - Shared Networks**

Several technical controls are in place for controlling networks:

- Networks within Microsoft Azure are segregated via VLANs

- The corporate network is segregated from Microsoft Azure environment.

- Logging and monitoring is performed on critical network devices

- Critical communications such as calls to the API or intra-Microsoft Azure communication is encrypted, authenticated, and integrity controlled via protocols such as SSL

In addition, these controls are internally assessed for compliance with Microsoft Azure policies and standards.

"Network security management and user access management" is covered under the ISO 27001 standards, specifically addressed in Annex A, domains 10.6 and 11.2. For more information, review of the publicly available ISO standards we are certified against is suggested."

42. Is there an effective audit process that is actioned at regular intervals to ensure that user accounts are appropriately managed?

See answer to question 40.

43. Have the controls required to manage the risks associated with the ubiquitous access provided by the cloud been identified?

In regard to controls identified by Microsoft as being required to address such risks that fall within its sphere of responsibility, yes. See answer to question 40. In addition, at a high level the breakdown of access control responsibilities is as follows:

Microsoft

• Manages access restrictions to data within Azure at the physical and logical level.

• Provisions and deprovisions internal administrator accounts and their privileges.

• Ensures only secure logon procedures, including multi-factor authentication are in place for internal Microsoft administrators.

• Monitors and audits the activities of internal Microsoft users.

• Provides mechanisms to authenticate customer administrator access to the Azure administration portal and control their ability to configure settings on the Customer Azure subscription.

• Monitors for and prevents inappropriate access attempts to Customer VMs.

Customers

• Provision, manage and deprovision users in their Application or integrate with a third party identity service for user information.

• Manage the secure authentication of users and integrate with a multi-factor authentication mechanism if required.

• Manage the configuration of access rights and privileges and their enforcement by their Application.

• Manage access logs of the Application.

• Monitor for inappropriate access to the Application.

44. Does the cloud service meet those control requirements?

This question is for customers to answer.

45. Is there a higher level of assurance required that the party asserting an identity is the authorised user of the account when authenticating to the service? (I.e. is multi-factor authentication necessary?)

All Microsoft staff or subcontractors involved in provision of Microsoft Azure services are required to use multi factor authentication. Customers can utilise multi-factor authentication to control their users' access. For more information on multi-factor authentication with Azure Active Directory, please see http://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/documentation/articles/multi-factor-authentication/.

In regard to Microsoft's internal use of multi-factor authentication, the document entitled "Microsoft Azure Standard Response to RFI - Privacy and Security" states:

• SA-07: Security Architecture - Remote User Multi-Factor Authentication

Access to the Microsoft Azure production environments by staff and contractors is tightly controlled. All access requires management approval. Automation exists to remove access upon change in employee status. All other access is tracked and reviewed on a regular basis.

Terminal Services servers are configured to use the highest encryption setting.

Remote access requires two-factor authentication to a secure terminal server. Microsoft users must have a Microsoft-issued smartcard with a valid certificate and a valid domain account to establish a remote access session.

"Microsoft user authentication for external connections" is covered under the ISO 27001 standards, specifically addressed in Annex A, domain 11.4.2. For more information, we suggest a review of the publicly available ISO standards for which we are certified."

3.5.2 Multi-Tenancy

The resource pooling characteristic of cloud computing means that cloud services typically use some form of multi-tenancy. This enables service providers to deliver services at a lower cost than traditional delivery models by allowing multiple customers (tenants) to share the same compute resources and/or instance of an application. While resource pooling and sharing has obvious benefits in terms of costs it does introduce security risks that must be understood by agencies wishing to leverage the benefits of cloud computing. The risks associated with multi-tenancy are typically related to either infrastructure virtualisation or data commingling.

Virtualisation is a key technology in the delivery of cloud services as it enables information systems to be abstracted from the underlying hardware using a hypervisor (i.e. software that enables a host server to run multiple guest operating systems concurrently). The most often cited area of concern within a virtualised environment is that a malicious party could exploit a vulnerability within the hypervisor to gain access to another customers' information (e.g. by performing a 'guest-to-host' or 'guest-to-guest' attack).

Virtualisation has made it easy to take a snapshot (i.e. a copy of a running server's memory and disk at a point in time for backup and redundancy purposes). If the snapshots are not appropriately protected, a malicious party may be able to gain unauthorised access to the information stored on the virtual machine's local drives and all encryption keys and data stored in memory. As a result, the service provider's architecture, implementation and ongoing management and monitoring of the virtualisation environment together with their patch and vulnerability management practices are key to ensuring the security of information stored and processed within the cloud service.

Another common concern in IaaS and PaaS environments is that the customer with the weakest security practices and controls may determine the security of the entire environment (the lowest common denominator problem). For example, a co-tenant that does not harden its operating systems and applications could define the security of the environment to the lowest common denominator if there are not appropriate controls in place to isolate customer's virtual machines and networks from each other.

SaaS and PaaS services use logical controls within the application or platform and supporting infrastructure to isolate access to each customer's data. However, the data is usually commingled within the application, database and back-up media. This places complete reliance on the quality of the design, implementation and enforcement of access controls within the platforms and applications.

The on-demand self-service characteristic of cloud computing introduces security concerns because the registration processes to become a customer are not always robust in confirming a customer's identity (i.e. web-based self-registration). This weakness can allow a malicious party to register for a service to then use it for malicious or fraudulent activities that may include attempting to subvert the access controls to gain unauthorised access to another customer's data.

An agency must be sufficiently assured that other customers using a cloud service cannot subvert the service provider's controls to gain access to its data. As discussed, this can be difficult as the "as a service" nature of cloud computing often means a lack of transparency regarding the security controls and practices that the

service provider has in place to protect their customers' data. Consequently, there is again a strong dependency on third-party audit reports and penetration testing.

Considerations	Respondent
46. Will the service provider allow the agency to review a recent third-party audit report (e.g. ISO 27001 or ISAE 3402 SOC 2 Type II) that includes an assessment of the security controls and practices related to virtualisation and separation of customer's data?	Microsoft
47. Will the service provider permit customers to undertake security testing (including penetration tests) to assess the efficacy of the access controls used to enforce separation of customer's data?	Microsoft
48. Does the service provider's customer registration processes provide an appropriate level of assurance in line with the value, criticality and sensitivity of the information to be placed in the cloud service?	Joint

Microsoft Responses

46. Will the service provider allow the agency to review a recent third-party audit report (e.g. ISO 27001 or ISAE 3402 SOC 2 Type II) that includes an assessment of the security controls and practices related to virtualisation and separation of customer's data?

Yes - see answer to question 34 above.

In addition to this information, Microsoft advises customers to review the document entitled "Microsoft Azure Standard Response to RFI - Privacy and Security" which states, in response to CSA CCM Control ID **SA-09: Security Architecture – Segmentation**:

The networks within the Microsoft Azure data centres are designed to have multiple separate network segments. This segmentation helps to provide separation of critical, back-end servers and storage devices from the public-facing interfaces. Customer access to services provided over the Internet originates from users' Internet-enabled locations and ends at a Microsoft data centre. Networks are logically separated wherever necessary depending on the trust bounties. Network ACLs and filters are incorporated to segregate the traffic among the network segments.

"Security of network services" is covered under the ISO 27001 standards, specifically addressed in Annex A, domain 10.6.2. For more information, review of the publicly available ISO standards we are certified against is suggested.

47. Will the service provider permit customers to undertake security testing (including penetration tests) to assess the efficacy of the access controls used to enforce separation of customer's data?

Yes. See answer to question 33(a) above.

48. Does the service provider's customer registration processes provide an appropriate level of assurance in line with the value, criticality and sensitivity of the information to be placed in the cloud service?

This question is for customers to answer. Microsoft Azure customers register for the service by creating a subscription through the Azure Portal web site. Customers manage applications and storage through their subscription using the Azure management portal.

3.5.3 Standard Operating Environments

Although not unique to cloud computing it is important to acknowledge that one of the biggest causes of information security incidents is poorly configured and managed information systems. While the service provider is entirely responsible for ensuring that their SaaS solution is appropriately configured and managed, the responsibility is shared between the agency and the service provider in the other cloud service models (i.e. IaaS and PaaS). Agencies that do not have defined and documented build and hardening standards for operating systems and applications they are planning to deploy on IaaS or PaaS cloud services may find it difficult to effectively protect their systems against unauthorised access.

Where an agency decides to delegate the build and hardening of the operating systems and applications to the service provider, it must determine whether it is appropriate to accept the provider standards or define its own. Irrespective of the approach that is selected by the agency it is recommended that a penetration test be undertaken to ensure that services are initially deployed in a secure manner.

Considerations	Respondent
49. Are there appropriate build and hardening standards defined and documented for the service components the agency is responsible for managing?	Customer
50. Can the agency deploy operating systems and applications in accordance with internal build or hardening standards? If no, does the service provider have appropriate build and hardening standards that meet the agency's security requirements?	Joint
a. Does the virtual image include a host-based firewall configured to only allow the ingress and egress (inbound and outbound) traffic necessary to support the service?	Microsoft
b. Does the service provider allow host-based intrusion detection and prevention service (IDS/IDP) agents to be installed within the virtual machines?	Microsoft
51. Does the service provider perform regular tests of its security processes and controls? Will they provide customers with a copy of the associated reports?	Microsoft
52. Can a penetration test of the service be performed to ensure that it has been securely deployed?	Microsoft

Microsoft Responses

49. Are there appropriate build and hardening standards defined and documented for the service components the agency is responsible for managing?

This question is for customers to answer. In doing so, they may find it useful to review the Microsoft document entitled "Security Management in Microsoft Azure".

50. Can the agency deploy operating systems and applications in accordance with internal build or hardening standards? If no, does the service provider have appropriate build and hardening standards that meet the agency's security requirements?

Yes. Customers can deploy operating systems based on their internal build or hardening standards. For reference, The Virtual Machines list of compatible Microsoft software and Windows versions is available here. The Virtual Machines list of compatible Linux software and versions is available here. The Cloud Services list of compatible operating systems is available here.

50a. Does the virtual image include a host-based firewall configured to only allow the ingress and egress (inbound and outbound) traffic necessary to support the service?

See answer to question 50b.

50b. Does the service provider allow host-based intrusion detection and prevention service (IDS/IDP) agents to be installed within the virtual machines?

Yes. Microsoft Azure virtual machines are configured by default with a Windows Firewall or Linux equivalent on Linux gallery images, configured to permit appropriate ingress and egress traffic. The customer may choose to modify, remove or replace this firewall. Customers also have the option to use third-party virtual firewall appliances. To gain more understanding of how secure Azure Virtual Machines and Azure Cloud Services, Microsoft encourages customers to review the document entitled "Microsoft Azure Network Security".

50c. Does the service provider allow host-based intrusion detection and prevention service (IDS/IDP) agents to be installed within the virtual machines?

Yes. Host based intrusion detection may be deployed by a customer onto an Azure Virtual Machine. Microsoft Azure also supports extensions for Microsoft provided or third party antimalware tools to be configured with logs and alerts either stored within a Microsoft Azure storage account or transferred to an on-premises SIEM monitoring solution. Customers are encouraged to review the documents entitled "Microsoft Antimalware for Azure Cloud Services v2" and "Microsoft Azure security and Audit Log Management".

51. Does the service provider perform regular tests of its security processes and controls? Will they provide customers with a copy of the associated reports?

Microsoft conducts regular testing to improve Azure security controls and processes, as independently verified in our (Service Organization Control) SOC 1 (SSAE 16/ISAE 3402) and SOC 2 (AT 101) reports.

51a. Will they provide customers with a copy of the associated reports?

We do not provide copies of these reports externally as doing so could compromise the security of Azure services.

52. Can a penetration test of the service be performed to ensure that it has been securely deployed?

See answer to question 33(a) above.

3.5.4 Patch and Vulnerability Management

Improved patch and vulnerability management is often cited as one of the main benefits of moving to the cloud. Vulnerabilities present a significant risk to any information system, particularly those that are exposed to the Internet. The ubiquitous access provided by cloud services means that it is very important that agencies ensure that these services are patched in a timely manner.

It is important to identify which party is responsible for patching each component of a cloud service (e.g. the application, operating system, hypervisor software, Application Programming Interface (API) etc.). As discussed, the cloud service model (i.e. SaaS, PaaS or IaaS) usually dictates which party is responsible for the management and maintenance of individual components.

Where the service provider is responsible the agency must ensure that Terms of Service and SLA specify the maximum time period permitted between a patch being released by a vendor and being applied to all affected systems (i.e. the maximum exposure window).

Where the agency is responsible for applying patches it must ensure that it has an effective patch management process and monitors appropriate sources for vulnerability alerts (e.g. the vendor's website and/or mailing list, Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) website) to ensure patches are identified and deployed in a timely manner.

Considerations	Respondent
53. Is the service provider responsible for patching all components that make up the cloud service? If no, has the agency identified which components the service provider is responsible for and which it is responsible for?	Joint
54. Does the service provider's Terms of Service or SLA include service levels for patch and vulnerability management that includes a defined the maximum exposure window?	Microsoft
55. Does the agency currently have an effective patch and vulnerability management process?	Customer
56. Has the agency ensured that all of the components that it is responsible for have been incorporated into its patch and vulnerability management process?	Customer
57. Is the agency subscribed to, or monitoring, appropriate sources for vulnerability and patch alerts for the components that it is are responsible for?	Customer
58. Does the service provider allow its customers to perform regular vulnerability assessments?	Microsoft
59. Do the Terms of Service or SLA include a compensation clause for breaches caused by vulnerabilities in the service? If yes, does it provide an adequate level of compensation should a breach occur?	Joint

Microsoft Responses

53. Is the service provider responsible for patching all components that make up the cloud service? If no, has the agency identified which components the service provider is responsible for and which it is responsible for?

In regard to patching, the document entitled "Microsoft Azure Standard Response to RFI - Privacy and Security" states:

IS-20 Information Security - Vulnerability / Patch Management

"Azure component teams get notifications of potential vulnerabilities and the latest software updates from the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) and Microsoft Cloud Infrastructure and Operations (MCIO). The component teams analyse software updates relevance to Azure production environment and review the associated vulnerabilities based on their criticality. Software updates are released through the monthly OS release cycle using change and release management procedures. Emergency out-of-band security software updates (0-day & Software Security Incident Response Process - SSIRP updates) are deployed as quickly as possible. If customers use the default "Auto Upgrade" option, software updates will be applied their VMs automatically. Otherwise, customers have the option to upgrade to the latest OS image through the portal. In case of a VM role, customers are responsible for evaluating and updating their VMs.

Microsoft's Security Response Center (MSRC) regularly monitors external security vulnerability awareness sites. As part of the routine vulnerability management process, Azure evaluates our exposure to these vulnerabilities and leads action across the Microsoft Cloud and Enterprise division to mitigate risks when necessary.

"Control of technical vulnerabilities" is covered under the ISO 27001 standard, specifically addressed in Annex A, domain 12.6. For more information, it is recommended that customers review the ISO standards we are certified against."

53a. If no, has the agency identified which components the service provider is responsible for and which it is responsible for?

See answer to question 53.

54. Does the service provider's Terms of Service or SLA include service levels for patch and vulnerability management that includes a defined the maximum exposure window?

No. While Microsoft has extensive controls in place in regard to patch and vulnerability management, in accord with many of the standards Microsoft complies with, it does not include service levels for patch and vulnerability management in the Microsoft Online Service terms (OST) or the SLA for Microsoft Azure services that are available here.

55. Does the agency currently have an effective patch and vulnerability management process?

This question is for customers to answer.

56. Has the agency ensured that all of the components that it is responsible for have been incorporated into its patch and vulnerability management process?

This question is for customers to answer.

57. Is the agency subscribed to, or monitoring, appropriate sources for vulnerability and patch alerts for the components that it is are responsible for?

This question is for customers to answer.

58. Does the service provider allow its customers to perform regular vulnerability assessments?

Yes. See answer to question 33(a) above. Please note that penetration testing may also include vulnerability assessment.

59. Do the Terms of Service or SLA include a compensation clause for breaches caused by vulnerabilities in the service?

No. Neither the Online Service Terms nor the SLA for Microsoft Azure contain a compensation clause for breaches caused by vulnerabilities in the service.

59a. If yes, does it provide an adequate level of compensation should a breach occur?

Not applicable.

3.5.5 Encryption

Encryption is often presented as the solution for addressing confidentiality risks within the cloud. There are, however, a number of important limitations that should be understood and considered by agencies planning adoption of cloud services. Agencies must determine their specific requirements for protecting information using encryption. Careful consideration must be given to:

- What information needs to be encrypted? All information held by the cloud service or only certain data types, or database rows, columns or entities?
- Why does the information need to be encrypted? For example, is encryption required to achieve compliance with a policy or standard?
- How should the information be encrypted? For example, what protocols and algorithms should be used?
- Who will encrypt the information and manage the encryption keys? The agency or the service provider?
- Where should the information be encrypted and decrypted? Within the agency, on the client devices or within the cloud service?
- When does the information need to be encrypted and decrypted? In transit, by the application (message encryption) and/or at rest?

While encryption is an effective control for protecting the confidentiality of data at rest, for data to be processed by a business rule within an information system, generally it must be unencrypted. As a result, it may be impractical or impossible to encrypt data stored within a cloud service that actually processes information (as opposed to simple storage).

Where a cloud service is capable of storing data in an encrypted format it is important to know which party (the agency or the service provider) is responsible for managing the encryption keys. It is important to note that if the service provider has access to, or manages, the encryption keys then they will be able to decrypt and access the information held in the cloud service. This has data sovereignty implications if encryption is used to treat risks related to information being stored outside New Zealand.

The party that manages the encryption keys must have an effective key management plan. Key management is essential to ensure that encryption keys are protected from being compromised, which could result in unauthorised disclosure or the agency no longer being able to access its information. It may also affect an agency's ability to meet its obligations under the Official Information Act 1982 and the Public Records Act 2005. The NZISM specifies the key management practices required to effectively manage cryptographic keys.

The interception of data in transit is an inherent risk whenever sensitive information traverses a network, especially a network not owned or managed by the agency such as the Internet or a service provider's network. Agencies must ensure that the cloud service encrypts all sensitive data in transit (including authentication credentials) using only approved encryption protocols and algorithms. Agencies relying on encryption should consider whether the encryption protocol, algorithm and key length used are appropriate. The NZISM specifies the encryption protocols and algorithms (together with recommended key lengths) that are approved for use by agencies for specific information classifications.

Consideration	Respondent
60. Have requirements for the encryption of the information that will be placed in the cloud service been determined?	Customer
61. Does the cloud service use only approved encryption protocols and algorithms (as defined in the NZISM)?	Joint
62. Which party is responsible for managing the cryptographic keys?	Joint
63. Does the party responsible for managing the cryptographic keys have a key management plan that meets the requirements defined in the NZISM?	Joint

Microsoft Responses

60. Have requirements for the encryption of the information that will be placed in the cloud service been determined?

This question is for customers to answer. Microsoft's paper entitled Protecting Data in Microsoft Azure may be of assistance.

61. Does the cloud service use only approved encryption protocols and algorithms (as defined in the NZISM)?

At a high-level, Microsoft Azure's approach to encryption is as follows:

Platform Encryption

Among Microsoft Azure's data protection capabilities are built-in services, components and configurations that apply encryption to internal data and traffic. These serve to enable enhanced security for customer information, and also help enforce data governance and compliance with industry regulations (and are mandated as such).

Many of these mechanisms are enabled by default in the platform while others need to be configured by a customer administrator (such as IPsec VPN). Some can be optionally invoked at VM boot-time through service configuration files, or called by application components directly.

Azure implements encryption using both symmetric and asymmetric keys for encrypting and protecting confidentiality of data:

•   Software-based AES-256 for symmetric encryption/decryption

•   2048-bit or better for asymmetric keys

•   SHA-256 or better for secure hashing

Encryption in Transit

Microsoft Azure uses virtual networking to isolate tenants' traffic from one another, employing measures such as host- and guest-level firewalls, IP packet filtering, port blocking, and HTTPS endpoints. However, most of Azure's internal communications, including infrastructure-to-infrastructure and infrastructure-to-customer (on-premises), are also encrypted.

For communications within an Azure datacentre, Microsoft manages networks to assure that no VM can impersonate or eavesdrop on the IP address of another. SSL/TLS is used when accessing Azure Storage or SQL Databases, or when connecting to Cloud Services. In this case, the customer administrator is responsible for obtaining a SSL/TLS certificate and deploying it to their tenant infrastructure.

VM to VM

Data traffic moving between Virtual Machines in the same deployment or between tenants in a single deployment via Microsoft Azure Virtual Network can be protected through encrypted communication protocols such as HTTPS, SSL/TLS, or others.

Data leaving a customer's Cloud Service should be considered Internet-facing, and so appropriate safeguards such as HTTPS or VPN are recommended.

Customer to Cloud

Moving data into and out of your cloud environment is protected through the options available in Azure. This includes management operations, data transfers, and key provisioning. Customers can optionally configure SSL/TLS for defence-in-depth on their Virtual Networks; SSL/TLS is mandatory when accessing the Azure Portal or System Management API (SMAPI).

For small amounts of data, connections directly to your Azure Virtual Network can be made over encrypted connections, such as by an IPsec VPN into your tenant environment; larger data sets can be moved over an isolated high-speed channel such as the new ExpressRoute feature. If ExpressRoute is being used, you can encrypt the data at the application-level using SSL/TLS or other protocols for added protection.

In addition, when interacting with Azure Storage through the Azure Portal, all transactions occur via HTTPS. Storage REST API over HTTPS can also be used to interact with Azure Storage and Azure SQL Database. When populating data into Azure SQL Database, you can encrypt information before it is copied over. Note that data only remains encrypted until it is used and placed in memory on the Azure SQL Database compute node, at which point it exists in an unencrypted state.

For more information, please see [Protecting Data in Microsoft Azure](#).

62. Which party is responsible for managing the cryptographic keys?

Microsoft manages keys for the encryption it applies to the Azure environment. Customers are also able to apply their own encryption, as discussed in Protecting Data in Microsoft Azure.

In regard to management of keys to customer applied encryption, that document states:

"Encryption and authentication do not improve security unless the keys themselves are well protected. It is generally considered a critical IT security task to manage key lifecycles, as proper key management is important to maintaining high security, high reliability, and low overhead."

Customers may be interested to note that the Microsoft Azure Key Vault secure encryption key management service allows them to encrypt keys and small secrets like passwords with keys stored in Hardware Security Modules (HSMs). For added assurance, customers can import or generate keys in HSMs certified to FIPS 140-2 level 2 standards – so that their keys stay within the HSM boundary. Key Vault is designed so that Microsoft does not see or extract customers' keys.

63. Does the party responsible for managing the cryptographic keys have a key management plan that meets the requirements defined in the NZISM?

Yes. There is an ISO 27001 certified internal process for managing encryption keys, as referred to in the document entitled "Microsoft Azure Standard Response to RFI - Privacy and Security" where, in regard to CSA CCM control ID IS-19 Information Security - Encryption Key Management, Microsoft states:

"Microsoft has policies, procedures, and mechanisms established for effective key management to support encryption of data in storage and in transmission for the key components of the Azure service.

"Media Handling" is covered under the ISO 27001 standards, specifically addressed in Annex A, domain 10.7.3. For more information, review of the publicly available ISO standards we are certified against is suggested."

3.5.6 Cloud Service Provider Insider Threat

Unauthorised access to sensitive information by the service provider's employees is a common concern for organisations planning to use cloud services. The controls required to manage this risk are no different from those used to protect against malicious insiders within the agency or a traditional outsource provider.

Agencies should ascertain whether the service provider has appropriate procedures in place to ensure its personnel are reliable, trustworthy and do not pose a security risk to its clients. The level of assurance available to agencies may vary significantly depending on the physical location of the service provider's service and its employees. For example, a New Zealand based service provider will be able to perform a standard Ministry of Justice criminal history check for all employees and require staff that manage system components that store, process or transmit the agency's data to gain New Zealand Security Intelligence Service security clearance (e.g. CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP SECRET). However, where a service is delivered or supported from another country these New Zealand specific checks will not be possible. In such circumstances agencies must consider whether the alternatives available to the service provider can provide an equivalent level of assurance.

Whilst vetting may prevent a service provider from employing someone that has a history of being untrustworthy, it does have its limitations. For example, vetting that reveals a criminal record may result in a potential employee being rejected. However, candidates that are untrustworthy but have never been caught or haven't been convicted may not be identified. Similarly, a previously trustworthy employee may become untrustworthy if they become disgruntled or their personal circumstances change. These risks can be effectively managed if the service provider logs and monitors employees' activities and enforces separation of duties so that any malicious activity requires collusion from multiple sources making it less likely.

Logging and monitoring employees' activities is an important control to manage the risks associated with malicious insiders. Logging should cover all relevant activities performed by the service provider's employees that have logical or physical access to equipment or media that contains customer data. The service provider should monitor and review logs to identify any suspicious activity that requires investigation. In addition to this, duties should be separated to ensure that logs are protected from unauthorised modification and deletion (e.g. the administrator of a service component should not be granted modify or delete rights to the Security Information Event Monitoring (SIEM) service).

Consideration	Respondent
64. Does the service provider undertake appropriate pre-employment vetting for all staff that have access to customer data? Does the service provider perform on-going checks during the period of employment?	Microsoft
65. If the service provider is dependent on a third-party to deliver any part of their service, does the third-party undertake appropriate pre-employment vetting for all staff that have access to customer data?	Microsoft
66. Does the service provider have a SIEM service that logs and monitors all logical access to customer data?	Microsoft
67. Does the service provider enforce separation of duties to ensure that audit logs are protected against unauthorised modification and deletion?	Microsoft
68. Do the Terms of Service or SLA require the service provider to report unauthorised access to customer data by its employees? If yes, is the service provider required to provide details about the incident to affected customers to enable them to assess and manage the associated impact?	Microsoft

Microsoft Responses

64. Does the service provider undertake appropriate pre-employment vetting for all staff that have access to customer data? Does the service provider perform on-going checks during the period of employment?

Microsoft requires full time employees (FTEs) and vendors to undergo a background check as part of the Microsoft HR hiring practice. Background checks are required for both new hires and personnel transferring to positions that involve access to customers' work sites and/or sensitive areas. Microsoft standard background check includes but is not limited to review of information relating to education, employment, and criminal history. Typically, the period of the check is 7 years.

This practice meets the requirements of ISO 27002:2013 Control: Background verification checks on all candidates for employment should be carried out in accordance with relevant laws, regulations and ethics and should be proportional to the business requirements, the classification of the information to be processed and the perceived risks.

65. If the service provider is dependent on a third-party to deliver any part of their service, does the third-party undertake appropriate pre-employment vetting for all staff that have access to customer data?

Yes. See answer to question 64.

66. Does the service provider have a SIEM service that logs and monitors all logical access to customer data?

Yes, with customer participation. Microsoft Azure internally logs access requests, authorisations and access events to sensitive systems and data to a SIEM toolset. Customers may choose to configure logging of data access events to either an Azure storage account or on premises SIEM tool using Azure Monitoring and Diagnostics Service. Microsoft recommends that customers review the document entitled "Microsoft Azure security and Audit Log Management".

67. Does the service provider enforce separation of duties to ensure that audit logs are protected against unauthorised modification and deletion?

Yes, for platform services, access to monitoring and diagnostics information is protected using ACLs. Log files are protected using storage keys. Microsoft recommends that customers review the document entitled "Protecting Data in Microsoft Azure"

Also, in regard to segregation of duties, the CSA CCM control ID **IS-15 Information Security - Segregation of Duties** requires the following:

"Policies, process and procedures shall be implemented to enforce and assure proper segregation of duties. In those events where user-role conflict of interest constraint exists, technical controls shall be in place to mitigate any risks arising from unauthorized or unintentional modification or misuse of the organization's information assets."

As set out in our document entitled "Microsoft Azure Standard Response to RFI - Privacy and Security", in response to this control requirement we state:

"Segregation of duties is established on critical functions within the Microsoft Azure environment to minimize the risk of unintentional or unauthorized access or change to production systems. Duties and responsibilities are segregated and defined between Microsoft Azure operation teams. Asset owners/custodians approve different accesses and privileges in the production environment.

Segregation of duties is implemented in Microsoft Azures' environments in order to minimize the potential of fraud, misuse, or error.

"Segregation of duties" is covered under the ISO 27001 standards, specifically addressed in Annex A, domain 10.1.3. For more information, review of the publicly available ISO standards we are certified against is suggested.

Also, CSA CCM control ID **IS-29 Information Security - Audit Tools Access** requires the following:

"Access to, and use of, audit tools that interact with the organizations information systems shall be appropriately segmented and restricted to prevent compromise and misuse of log data."

In response to this control requirement we state:

Access to information systems audit tools are restricted to authorized personnel within Microsoft Azure.

A delegated management model enables administrators to have only the access they need to perform specific tasks, reducing the potential for error and allowing access to systems and functions strictly on an as-needed basis. Microsoft Azure has formal monitoring processes to include frequency of review for Standard Operating Procedures and review oversight processes and procedures.

"Protection of information systems audit tools and protection of log information" is covered under the ISO 27001 standards, specifically addressed in Annex A, domains 15.3.2 and 10.10.3. For more information, review of the publicly available ISO standards we are certified against is suggested.

Finally, CSA CCM control ID **IS-33 Information Security - Source Code Access Restriction** requires the following:

"Access to application, program or object source code shall be restricted to authorized personnel on a need to know basis. Records shall be maintained regarding the individual granted access, reason for access and version of source code exposed."

In response to this control requirement we state:

"Microsoft Azure source code libraries are limited to authorized personnel. Where feasible, source code libraries maintain separate project work spaces for independent projects. Microsoft Azure and Microsoft Azure Contractors are granted access only to those work spaces which they need access to perform their duties. Source code libraries enforce control over changes to source code by requiring a review from designated reviewers prior to submission. An audit log detailing modifications to the source code library is maintained."

"Access control and access control to program source code" is covered under the ISO 27001 standards, specifically addressed in Annex A, domains 11 and 12.4.3. For more information, review of the publicly available ISO standards we are certified against is suggested."

68. Do the Terms of Service or SLA require the service provider to report unauthorised access to customer data by its employees?

Yes. The Microsoft Online Service terms (OST) state:

"**Security Incident Notification**

If Microsoft becomes aware of any unlawful access to any Customer Data stored on Microsoft's equipment or in Microsoft's facilities, or unauthorized access to such equipment or facilities resulting in loss, disclosure, or alteration of Customer Data (each a "Security Incident"), Microsoft will promptly (1) notify Customer of the Security Incident; (2) investigate the Security Incident and provide Customer with detailed information about the Security Incident; and (3) take reasonable steps to mitigate the effects and to minimize any damage resulting from the Security Incident.

Notification(s) of Security Incidents will be delivered to one or more of Customer's administrators by any means Microsoft selects, including via email. It is Customer's sole responsibility to ensure Customer's administrators maintain accurate contact information on each applicable Online Services portal. Microsoft's obligation to report or respond to a Security Incident under this section is not an acknowledgement by Microsoft of any fault or liability with respect to the Security Incident.

Customer must notify Microsoft promptly about any possible misuse of its accounts or authentication credentials or any security incident related to an Online Service."

68a. If yes, is the service provider required to provide details about the incident to affected customers to enable them to assess and manage the associated impact?

See answer to question 68.

3.5.7 Data Persistence

It can be difficult to permanently delete data from a multi-tenant cloud service when the organisation scales down or terminates its use of the service. If data is not securely deleted a future compromise of the service may still expose agency information. Similar issues arise if the service provider does not have processes to ensure that ICT equipment and storage media (e.g. hard disk drives, backup tapes etc.) are securely wiped before redeployment or disposal. Therefore, it is essential that organisations establish that the service provider has robust and demonstrable data destruction and disposal processes in place.

Considerations	Respondent
69. Does the service provider have an auditable process for the secure sanitisation of storage media before it is made available to another customer?	Microsoft
70. Does the service provider have an auditable process for secure disposal or destruction of ICT equipment and storage media (e.g. hard disk drives, backup tapes etc.) that contain customer data?	Microsoft

69. Does the service provider have an auditable process for the secure sanitisation of storage media before it is made available to another customer?

Yes. In regard to secure sanitization of storage media the CSA CCM control ID **DG-05 Data Governance - Secure Disposal** requires the following:

"Policies and procedures shall be established and mechanisms implemented for the secure disposal and complete removal of data from all storage media, ensuring data is not recoverable by any computer forensic means."

As set out in the document "Microsoft Azure Standard Response to RFI - Privacy and Security", in response to this control requirement we state:

"Microsoft uses best practice procedures and a wiping solution that is NIST 800-88 compliant. For hard drives that can't be wiped we use a destruction process that destroys it (i.e. shredding) and renders the recovery of information impossible (e.g., disintegrate, shred, pulverize, or incinerate). The appropriate means of disposal is determined by the asset type. Records of the destruction are retained.

All Microsoft Azure services utilize approved media storage and disposal management services. Paper documents are destroyed by approved means at the pre-determined end-of-life cycle.

"Secure disposal or re-use of equipment and disposal of media" is covered under the ISO 27001 standards, specifically addressed in Annex A, domains 9.2.6 and 10.7.2. For more information, review of the publicly available ISO standards we are certified against is suggested."

Microsoft also suggests that customers review the document entitled "Protecting Data in Microsoft Azure".

70. Does the service provider have an auditable process for secure disposal or destruction of ICT equipment and storage media (e.g. hard disk drives, backup tapes etc.) that contain customer data?

Yes. See answer to question 69 that details relevant processes that are covered in our ISO 27001 audit certification. Customers may also like to review the document entitled "Microsoft Azure Data Security (Data Cleansing and Leakage)".

3.5.8 Physical Security

Physical security controls are vital to ensure that information is physically protected from unauthorised access by both malicious service provider personnel and third parties. Effective information security is dependent on the efficacy of the physical controls implemented to protect the service provider's offices, datacentres and physical assets.

SIGS, the NZISM and the Protective Security Manual (PSM) define the minimum physical security controls that must be in place to adequately protect official information based on its classification.

However, as discussed it may not be possible or practical to directly assess the physical controls that the service provider has implemented to protect its customer data within a cloud service. An agency may be limited to reviewing a third party audit report.

Considerations	Respondent
71. If it is practical to do so (i.e. the datacentre is within New Zealand), can the service provider's physical security controls be directly reviewed or assessed by the agency? If no, will the service provider allow the agency to review of a recent third party audit report (e.g. ISO 27001 or ISAE 3402 SOC 2 Type II) that includes an assessment of their physical security controls?	Microsoft
72. Do the service provider's physical security controls meet the minimum requirements as defined in the New Zealand government's security guidelines to protect the information stored in the cloud service?	Customer

Microsoft Responses

71. If it is practical to do so (i.e. the datacentre is within New Zealand), can the service provider's physical security controls be directly reviewed or assessed by the agency?

The document "Microsoft Azure Standard Response to RFI - Security and Privacy" sets out our response to CSA CCM Facilities Security controls ID **FS-01 through FS-08**. The purposes and details of these controls are covered under the ISO 27001 standard, specifically addressed in Annex A, domains 7, 9 & 10 (including sub-domains thereof). For more information, it is recommended that customers review the ISO standards we are certified against."

Microsoft can arrange for customers to visit our datacentres. However, such visits do not permit a thorough, audit-style review of our physical security controls. The physical security controls applied by our Microsoft Cloud Infrastructure and Operation (MCIO) team which runs our Global Data Center operations are audited by third parties on an annual basis. Customers can contact their account representative to request a copy of the ISO, SOC 1 Type 2 and SOC 2 Type 2 reports for Azure.

We encourage customers to review the document entitled "Microsoft Azure Security: Technical Insights."

71a. If no, will the service provider allow the agency to review of a recent third party audit report (e.g. ISO 27001 or ISAE 3402 SOC 2 Type II) that includes an assessment of their physical security controls?

Yes - see answer to question 71.

72. Do the service provider's physical security controls meet the minimum requirements as defined in the New Zealand government's security guidelines to protect the information stored in the cloud service?

This question is for customers to answer.

3.6 Data Integrity

Service providers can provide significantly different levels of protection against data loss or corruption. Some providers include data backup services as part of the base service offering, others offer them as an additional cost service and some do not offer them at all (e.g. Google Apps for Business does not provide any back-up services without a subscription to Google Apps Vault at additional cost). As a result, it is important to identify what level of protection the service provider offers and to assess whether or not they meet the agency's business requirements for recovering from data loss and corruption incidents.

It is essential to identify how the service provider protects its customers from data loss or corruption as it can indicate the level of protection provided. If the service provider replicates customer data to another datacentre in near real-time (e.g. every 5 minutes) a corruption could be replicated before it is detected. Similarly, if data is backed-up to tape on a daily basis then a Recovery Point Objective (RPO) of less than 24 hours may not be possible.

Agencies should ascertain the level of granularity offered for data restoration (e.g. can a single file or email be restored or are customers limited to restoring an entire mailbox or database?). In addition to this, they should identify and understand the process for initiating a restore. For example, can a user restore an email or file they have accidentally deleted or will an authorised staff member need to log a call with the service provider?

Data loss or corruption could lead to information being permanently lost. This may mean that agencies are unable to meet their obligations under the Public Records Act 2005 and the Official Information Act 1982. Agencies are advised to assess whether the planned data backup and archiving strategy supports their compliance efforts. Agencies without specialised knowledge in these Acts are encouraged to seek advice from Archives New Zealand and/or the Ministry of Justice to ensure compliance.

It is important to realise that the use of cloud services may not preclude the need for an agency to develop, implement and test its own data backup strategy to ensure that it can sufficiently recover from an incident that results in data loss or corruption.

Considerations	Respondent
73. Does the service provider provide data backup or archiving services as part of their standard service offering to protect against data loss or corruption? If not, do they offer data backup or archiving services as an additional service offering to protect against data loss and corruption?	Microsoft
74. How are data backup and archiving services provided?	Microsoft
75. Does the SLA specify the data backup schedule?	Microsoft
76. Does the data back-up or archiving service ensure that business requirements related to protection against data loss are met? (I.e. does the service support the business Recovery Point Objective?)	Customer
77. What level of granularity does the service provider offer for data restoration?	Joint
78. What is the service provider's process for initiating a restore?	Microsoft
79. Does the service provider regularly perform test restores to ensure that data can be recovered from backup media?	Microsoft
80. Does the agency need to implement a data backup strategy to ensure that it can recover from an incident that leads to data loss or corruption?	Customer
81. Does the proposed data backup and archiving strategy support the agency in meeting its obligations under the Public Records Act and Official Information Act?	Customer

Microsoft Responses

73. Does the service provider provide data backup or archiving services as part of their standard service offering to protect against data loss or corruption? If not, do they offer data backup or archiving services as an additional service offering to protect against data loss and corruption?

Microsoft Azure does not specifically provide data backup or archiving services for IaaS based customer workloads. Customer data is automatically replicated within Azure - see below. Customers are responsible for taking any additional steps to provide further fault tolerance, for example creating historical backups of customer data, storing backups of customer data outside the Azure environment, deploying redundant compute instances within and across datacentres, or backing up state and data within a virtual machine.

Microsoft provides the ability for the customer to build this capability themselves over the top of Azure Storage. To assist in their due diligence customers are advised to note that CSA CCM Control ID **DG-04 Data Governance - Retention Policy** requires the following:

"Policies and procedures for data retention and storage shall be established and backup or redundancy mechanisms implemented to ensure compliance with regulatory, statutory, contractual or business requirements. Testing the recovery of disk or tape backups must be implemented at planned intervals."

In our response set out in the document "Microsoft Azure Standard Response to RFI - Security and Privacy" we state:

"Data retention policies and procedures are defined and maintained in accordance to regulatory, statutory, contractual or business requirements. The Microsoft Azure backup and redundancy program undergoes an annual review and validation.

Microsoft Azure backs up infrastructure data regularly and validates restoration of data periodically for disaster recovery purposes.

Microsoft Azure includes replication features detailed below to help prevent loss of customer data in the event of failures within a Microsoft data center. Customers are responsible for taking additional steps to provide added fault tolerance, such as creating historical backups of customer data, storing backups of customer data off the platform, deploying redundant compute instances within and across data centers, or backing up state and data within a virtual machine.

"Information back-up" is covered under the ISO 27001 standards, specifically addressed in Annex A, domain 10.5.1. For more information, review of the publicly available ISO standards we are certified against is suggested."

In addition, the document entitled "Protecting Data in Microsoft Azure" states:

"For customers using Microsoft Azure Storage, the service geo-replicates customer's Blob and Table, and Queue data. Data is replicated between two (2) locations hundreds of miles apart within the same region (i.e., between North and South United States, between North and West Europe, and between East and Southeast Asia). Geo-replication is provided for additional data durability in case of a major datacentre disaster and even transient hardware failures have three (3) options for replicating the data in your storage account:

- **Locally redundant storage (LRS)** is replicated three times within a single datacenter. When you write data to a blob, queue, or table, the write operation is performed synchronously across all three replicas. LRS protects your data from normal hardware failures.

- **Geo-redundant storage (GRS)** is replicated three (3) times within a single region, and is also replicated asynchronously to a second region hundreds of miles away from the primary region. GRS keeps an equivalent of six (6) copies (replicas) of your data (three in each region). GRS enable Microsoft to failover to a second region if we can't restore the first region due to a major outage or disaster. GRS is recommended over locally redundant storage.

- **Read-access geo-redundant storage (RA-GRS)** provides all of the benefits of geo-redundant storage noted above, and also allows read access to data at the secondary region in the event that the primary region becomes unavailable. Read-access geo-redundant storage is recommended for maximum availability in addition to durability."

74. How are data backup and archiving services provided?

See answer to question 73.

75. Does the SLA specify the data backup schedule?

No. Please note that data backup schedules are not a relevant concept in the context of Microsoft Azure's geo-replication features.

76. Does the data back-up or archiving service ensure that business requirements related to protection against data loss are met? (i.e. does the service support the business Recovery Point Objective?)

This is for the customer to answer. Please note the response to question 73 above.

The SLA for Microsoft Azure sets out a financially backed "minimum Monthly Uptime Percentage" but does not provide specific RPO and RTO guarantees other than for Microsoft Azure Site Recovery Service, where a RTO is specified.

Also, customers may like to review the Azure Business Continuity Technical Guidance available here.

77. What level of granularity does the service provider offer for data restoration?

Please note Microsoft's answer to question 73 above. We also encourage customers to review the document entitled "Microsoft Azure Security: Technical Insights."

78. What is the service provider's process for initiating a restore?

Restoration of customer controlled data is initiated by the Customer. The process of restoring data for which Microsoft has performed a backup is dependent on the specifics of the service being restored. Each service team has a defined backup and restoration process, supported by Microsoft Global Foundation Services backup and restoration procedures. It is important for customers to understand that the processes used internally to maintain the functionality and continuity of the Azure platform do not include the physical backup of customer data.

Microsoft also suggests that customers review the back and redundancy sections in the document entitled "Protecting Data in Microsoft Azure".

79. Does the service provider regularly perform test restores to ensure that data can be recovered from backup media?

See answer to question 73.

80. Does the agency need to implement a data backup strategy to ensure that it can recover from an incident that leads to data loss or corruption?

This question is for customers to answer. Microsoft recommends that all customers develop such a strategy as part of implementing good information management practices.

81. Does the proposed data backup and archiving strategy support the agency in meeting its obligations under the Public Records Act and Official Information Act?

This question is for customers to answer.

3.7 Availability

3.7.1 Service Level Agreement

The service provider's SLA typically specifies the level of expected availability performance as a percentage. It is important for agencies to understand exactly what the defined percentage means and to assess whether or not these levels meet the requirements for availability (e.g. 99.9% up time over a year allows for up to 9 hours of unscheduled outages without breaching the SLA).

The SLA should include the details of any scheduled outage windows. This will ensure that the service provider cannot schedule long outages (including emergency outages) with little or no notification without breaching the SLA.

Where scheduled outage windows are defined in the SLA they should be reviewed to ensure that they will not have an adverse impact on business operations. For example, if an SLA includes a 3 hour scheduled outage on the first Tuesday of each month between 17:00 and 20:00 Eastern Daylight Time, the outage would occur between 10:00 and 13:00 on Wednesday in New Zealand.

Some service providers use technologies to enable them to perform maintenance activities without the need for an outage, however, agencies should not assume that this is the case simply because scheduled outages are not defined in the SLA.

Another important consideration is the adequacy of the compensation provided if the SLA is breached and the method for calculating penalties over a service period. Typically an SLA for cloud services will specify minimal compensation such as service credits or discounted invoices. Agencies should review any compensation clauses taking into account the impact on the business if the service was unavailable to determine if the level of reparation is sufficient.

Considerations	Respondent
82. Does the SLA include an expected and minimum availability performance percentage over a clearly defined period? If yes, are the business requirements for availability met? (I.e. does the service support the business's Recovery Time Objective and Acceptable Interruption Window?)	Joint
83. Does the SLA include defined, scheduled outage windows?	Microsoft
a. If yes, do the specified outage windows affect New Zealand business operations?	Customer
b. If no, has the service provider implemented technologies that enable them to perform maintenance activities without the need for an outage?	Microsoft
84. Does the SLA include a compensation clause for a breach of the guaranteed availability percentages? If yes, does this provide an adequate level of compensation should the service provider breach the SLA?	Joint

Microsoft Responses

82. Does the SLA include an expected and minimum availability performance percentage over a clearly defined period?

Yes. The SLAs for Microsoft Azure services identify various service levels including connectivity uptime and other availability measures. These service levels are measured on a billing month basis. The majority of service level commitments for availability are at 99.9% or above. The Azure SLAs are available here.

82a. If yes, are the business requirements for availability met? (I.e. does the service support the business's Recovery Time Objective and Acceptable Interruption Window?)

This question is for customers to answer.

83. Does the SLA include defined, scheduled outage windows?

There are no defined, scheduled outage windows included in the SLAs for Microsoft Azure services.

83a. If yes, do the specified outage windows affect New Zealand business operations?

Not applicable

83b. If no, has the service provider implemented technologies that enable them to perform maintenance activities without the need for an outage?

For Virtual Machines that have two or more instances deployed in the same Availability Set, we guarantee you will have external connectivity at least 99.95% of the time.

There are two types of Azure platform events that can impact the availability of your virtual machines: planned maintenance and unplanned maintenance.

Planned maintenance events are periodic updates made by Microsoft to the underlying Azure platform to improve overall reliability, performance, and security of the platform infrastructure that your virtual machines run on. The majority of these updates are performed without any impact to your virtual machines or cloud services. However, there are instances where these updates require a reboot to your virtual machine to apply the required updates to the platform infrastructure.

Unplanned maintenance events occur when the hardware or physical infrastructure underlying your virtual machine has failed in some way. This may include local network failures, local disk failures, or other rack level failures. When such a failure is detected, the Azure platform will automatically migrate your virtual machine from the unhealthy physical machine hosting your virtual machine to a healthy physical machine. Such events are rare, but may also cause your virtual machine to reboot.

To reduce the impact of downtime due to one or more of these events, we recommend the following high availability best practices for your virtual machines:

• Configure multiple virtual machines in an Availability Set for redundancy

• Configure each application tier into separate Availability Sets

• Combine the Load Balancer with Availability Sets

• Avoid single instance virtual machines in Availability Sets

For detailed information please refer to the document Manage the availability of virtual machines.

84. Does the SLA include a compensation clause for a breach of the guaranteed availability percentages?

Yes. If the SLA commitment regarding minimum Monthly Uptime Percentage is breached, there is a sliding scale of service credits that customers may submit a claim for.

84a. If yes, does this provide an adequate level of compensation should the service provider breach the SLA?

This question is for customers to answer.

3.7.2 Denial of Service Attacks

Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are an inherent risk for all Internet facing services. The use of cloud services may increase the risk of such an attack eventuating as the aggregation of multiple agencies onto a single service may present a more attractive target for attackers. Similarly, an agency may suffer associated or collateral damage in an attack against a service provider or a cotenant. A DoS attack may be launched against the service provider or the agency itself.

Typically, it is difficult to protect against traffic based DoS attacks as they are intended to consume all the available resources and effective defences rely on blocking the source of the attack as close to the attackers location as possible. However, the use of cloud services may lessen the impact of some forms of DoS attacks as service providers have spare network bandwidth and computing capacity. In addition to this some service providers use protocols and technologies (e.g. Anycast, Application Delivery Networks and Content Delivery Networks) together with geographically dispersed datacentres to distribute network traffic and computer processing around the world.

The elastic nature of cloud services may also cause financial impacts. A successful DoS attack may force a service to scale exponentially resulting in abnormally high charges for resource use. This is usually referred

to as Economic Denial of Service (EDoS) or bill shock. Agencies using cloud services that scale to meet demand can effectively reduce the risk of unexpected charges by ensuring that they set boundaries to limit the resources that can be consumed to those required to meet their anticipated peak usage.

Considerations	Respondent
85. Does the service provider utilise protocols and technologies that can protect against DDoS attacks? If yes, does enabling the service provider's DDoS protection services affect the answer to questions 15, 16 and 17?	Microsoft
86. Can the agency specify or configure resource usage limits to protect against EDoS/bill shock?	Microsoft

Microsoft Responses

85. Does the service provider utilise protocols and technologies that can protect against DDoS attacks?

Microsoft Azure network infrastructure has a DDoS defence system in place that helps mitigate DDoS attacks. It uses standard DDoS mitigation techniques such as SYN cookies, rate limiting, and connection limits. DDoS protection systems are deployed in combination with Azure software load balancers to sanitize TCP and UDP traffic, including automated DDoS detection and mitigation. Additionally, Azure monitors and detects internally initiated DDoS attacks and removes offending VMs from the network.

IP spoofing based DDoS attacks cannot be launched from inside Azure because of anti-spoofing capabilities built into the infrastructure. Virtual host boundary protection built into Azure helps mitigate problems with tenant VM traffic, including generating spoofed traffic, directing traffic to protected infrastructure endpoints, sending or receiving inappropriate broadcast traffic, and receiving traffic not intended for VMs. Moreover, Azure ensures that all running VMs receive the resources they paid for. A malicious VM deployed to the Fabric cannot consume unlimited resources and cause starvation to its neighbours. Details of these arrangements is provided in the paper entitled "Microsoft Azure Security: Technical Insights".

Microsoft Azure Tenant Applications

Automated DDoS protection that is in place for Azure platform services also benefits tenant applications. However, it is still possible for tenant applications to be targeted individually. As a result, customers should actively monitor their Azure applications. If a customer notices their application is under attack, they should contact Microsoft Azure Customer Support to receive assistance. Azure Customer Support personnel are trained to react promptly to these types of requests.

The built-in Azure Firewall is secure by default, meaning that all incoming ports are blocked. The only ports open and addressable on a Azure VM are those explicitly defined in the Service Definition file configured by the customer. In addition to built-in Azure Firewall, customers can protect guest VMs by deploying third-party firewalls and intrusion detection systems inside a guest OS. For example, customers can use a web application firewall such as Barracuda to block a variety of web protocol attacks.

For further information, Microsoft encourages customers to review the document entitled "Microsoft Azure Network Security.

If yes, does enabling the service provider's DDoS protection services affect the answer to questions 15, 16 and 17?

No.

86. Can the agency specify or configure resource usage limits to protect against EDoS/bill shock?

Customers should actively monitor their Azure applications. In Microsoft's view this is the best the form of protection from EDoS/bill shock. Through resource monitoring, customers can check for peak areas of usage.

The Microsoft account team also has access to reporting to check the same. The ability to assign Role Based Access to Azure services means access can be limited to authorised users. However, effective monitoring of the environment is still the best form of protection.

3.7.3 Network Availability and Performance

The availability and performance of cloud services are heavily dependent on the supporting network infrastructure. The available bandwidth, latency, reliability and resiliency of local and international network connections could have a significant impact on user experience.

Agencies should evaluate the network connectivity between their users and the cloud service to ensure availability and performance requirements are met. This may be difficult if public networks (such as the Internet) are utilised in the delivery of the service, however, agencies should confirm that the network services they directly manage, or subscribe to, provide an adequate level of availability and bandwidth, together with sufficiently low latency and packet loss to meet the needs of the business.

Considerations	Respondent
87. Do the network services directly managed, or subscribed to by the agency provide an adequate level of availability?	Customer
88. Do the network services directly managed, or subscribed to by the agency provide an adequate level of redundancy/fault tolerance?	Customer
89. Do the network services directly managed, or subscribed to by the agency provide an adequate level of bandwidth (network throughput)?	Customer
90. Is the latency between the agency network(s) and the service provider's service at levels acceptable to achieve the desired user experience? If no, is the latency occurring on the network services directly managed, or subscribed to by the agency? Can the issue be resolved either by the network service provider or the agency?	Customer
91. Is the packet loss between the agency network(s) and the service provider's service at levels acceptable to achieve the desired user experience? If no, is the packet loss occurring on a network services directly managed, or subscribed to by the agency? Can the issue be resolved either by the network service provider or the agency?	Customer

3.7.4 Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery

The use of cloud services introduces a reliance on the service provider's business continuity and disaster recovery plans. Therefore, it is important to confirm that the service provider has adequate plans in place and to understand the level of continuity and recovery provided by them. It is also important to realise that the use of cloud services does not preclude the need for an agency to develop, implement and test its own business continuity and disaster recovery plans to ensure that it can continue to operate during a service outage.

As the cloud computing market is relatively immature, agencies should consider how they would recover business operations should a service provider go out of business or withdraw a service. They should ensure that the service provider uses common or de facto data format standards and provides a method to extract data in a format usable by the agency.

Considerations	Respondent
92. Does the service provider have business continuity and disaster recovery plans?	Microsoft
93. Will the service provider permit the agency to review of its business continuity and disaster recovery plans?	Microsoft
94. Do the service provider's plans cover the recovery of the agency data or only the restoration of the service?	Microsoft

95. If the service provider's plans cover the restoration of agency data, is the recovery of customer data prioritised? If so, how? Are customers prioritised based on size and contract value?	Microsoft
96. Does the service provider formally test its business continuity and disaster recovery plans on a regular basis? If yes, how regularly are such tests performed? Will they provide customers with a copy of the associated reports?	Microsoft
97. Does the agency have its own business continuity and disaster recovery plan in place to ensure that it can recover from a service outage, the service provider going out of business or withdrawing the service?	Customer
98. Does the agency require its own data backup strategy to ensure that it can recover from a service outage, the service provider going out of business or withdrawing the service?	Customer
99. Are the backups (whether performed by the service provider or the agency) encrypted using an approved encryption algorithm and appropriate key length?	Joint

Microsoft Responses

92. Does the service provider have business continuity and disaster recovery plans?

Yes. Microsoft Azure Disaster Recovery is addressed through Business Continuity Plans that are developed in line with industry best practices and to reflect the security controls of the production environment. Microsoft's Enterprise Business Continuity Management (EBCM) is based on the Disaster Recovery Institute International (DRII) Professional Practice Statements and the Business Continuity Institute (BCI) Good Practice Guidelines.

The document "Microsoft Azure Standard Response to RFI - Security and Privacy", sets out our response to CSA CCM Controls for resiliency, IDs RS-01 – RS-08.

The existence and efficacy of these business continuity and disaster recovery related controls is attested to by our ISO 27001:2013 certification.

93. Will the service provider permit the agency to review of its business continuity and disaster recovery plans?

No. Other than to our auditors, Microsoft does not disclose our DR/BC plans to external organisations. We do recommend that customers review the Azure Business Continuity Technical Guidance information available here.

94. Do the service provider's plans cover the recovery of the agency data or only the restoration of the service?

The Azure platform provides many services and this varies by service. For some services we fully implement the DR solution, for example recovery of customer account information. For other services we provide the building blocks for customers to implement the DR solution right for their business. MS Azure Storage introduced a "service" called Geo-Replication. It provides durability by constantly maintaining multiple healthy replicas of data. With geo-replication, Azure Storage now keeps data durable in two locations. It replicates customer data hundreds of miles between two locations (i.e., between North and South US, between North and West Europe, and between East and Southeast Asia) to provide disaster recovery in case of regional disasters.

This is focused around restoration of service for customers. Customers need to build their own DR/BC capabilities on top of the Azure platform.

95. If the service provider's plans cover the restoration of agency data, is the recovery of customer data prioritised?

Customers are responsible for maintaining their own backup and restoration strategy.

95a. If so, how? Are customers prioritised based on size and contract value?

Any support Microsoft may provide for recovery of customer data is not prioritised in relation to customer contract size or value.

96. Does the service provider formally test its business continuity and disaster recovery plans on a regular basis?

Yes. See answer to question 92. Customers should also note that they remain responsible for any service availability and performance issues that sit within their own span of control.

96a. If yes, how regularly are such tests performed?

Other than to our auditors, Microsoft does not disclose the frequency with which it tests the DR/BC plans for Microsoft Azure.

96b. Will they provide customers with a copy of the associated reports?

No.

97. Does the agency have its own business continuity and disaster recovery plan in place to ensure that it can recover from a service outage, the service provider going out of business or withdrawing the service?

This question is for customers to answer.

98. Does the agency require its own data backup strategy to ensure that it can recover from a service outage, the service provider going out of business or withdrawing the service?

This question is for customers to answer. Microsoft advises its customers to develop such a strategy.

99. Are the backups (whether performed by the service provider or the agency) encrypted using an approved encryption algorithm and appropriate key length?

See answer to question 61.

3.8 Incident Response and Management

The level of visibility and control of security incidents is likely to vary considerably across the cloud service models. The service provider is typically responsible for all incident management activities involving a SaaS solution, however, when an incident relates to a system located on an IaaS solution the customer is usually responsible for the incident management activities related to the platform, application and data and the service provider is only responsible for the activities directly related to the infrastructure components they manage. Similarly, the cloud deployment model (i.e. public, private, community or hybrid) adopted by the agency could significantly affect its visibility and control over the incident management activities. For example, customers of public cloud services normally have less visibility and control over incident management activities than those that have implemented a private cloud.

It is not reasonable to expect service providers to implement a separate incident response and management plan for each of their customers, therefore agencies need to gain an appropriate level of assurance that a service provider is capable of effectively and efficiently responding to an information security incident, as even the most meticulously planned, implemented and managed preventative controls can fail to stop a risk from eventuating. As a result, agencies need to review the service provider's Terms of Service and SLA to identify what, if any, support they provide to their customers during an information security incident.

Regardless of the service or deployment model, the use of cloud services does not preclude the need for an agency to have its own incident response and management process and plans. In fact, these plans are essential as they define how the agency will handle the tasks it is responsible for including roles and responsibilities, key contacts, incident definitions and notification criteria, escalation channels, evidence collection and preservation and post incident activities.

Considerations	Respondent
100. Does the service provider have a formal incident response and management process and plans that clearly define how they detect and respond to information security incidents? If yes, will they provide the agency with a copy of their process and plans to enable it to determine if they are sufficient?	Microsoft
101. Does the service provider test and refine its incident response and management process and plans on a regular basis?	Microsoft
102. Does the service provider engage its customers when testing its incident response and management processes and plans?	Microsoft
103. Does the service provider provide its staff with appropriate training on incident response and management processes and plans to ensure that they respond to incidents in an effective and efficient manner?	Microsoft
104. Does the service provider's Terms of Service or SLA clearly define the support they will provide to the agency should an information security incident arise? For example, does the service provider:	Microsoft
a. Notify customers when an incident that may affect the security of their information or interconnected systems is detected or reported?	Microsoft
b. Specify a point of contact and channel for customers to report suspected information security incidents?	Microsoft
c. Define the roles and responsibilities of each party during an information security incident?	Microsoft
d. Provide customers with access to evidence (e.g. time stamped audit logs and/or forensic snapshots of virtual machines etc.) to enable them to perform their own investigation of the incident?	Microsoft
e. Provide sufficient information to enable the agency to cooperate effectively with an investigation by a regulatory body, such as the Privacy Commissioner or the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC)?	Microsoft
f. Define which party is responsible for the recovery of data and services after an information security incident has occurred?	Microsoft
g. Share post incident reports with affected customers to enable them to understand the cause of the incident and make an informed decision about whether to continue using the cloud service?	Microsoft
h. Specify in the contract limits and provisions for insurance, liability and indemnity for information security incidents? (Note: it is recommended that agencies carefully review liability and indemnity clauses for exclusions.)	Microsoft
105. Does the service providers incident response and management procedures map to (or fit with) the agency internal policy and procedures; that does not hinder or delay the agency's ability to manage incidents in a timely and effective manner?	Customer

100. Does the service provider have a formal incident response and management process and plans that clearly define how they detect and respond to information security incidents?

The document "Microsoft Azure Standard Response to RFI - Security and Privacy" sets out various measures that Microsoft has put in place in relation to Azure security incident response and management processes and plans.

In particular, customers should note Microsoft's responses to CSA CCM Controls **IS-22 Information Security - Incident Management**, **IS-23 Information Security - Incident Reporting**, **IS-24 Information Security - Incident Response Legal Preparation** and **IS-25 Information Security - Incident Response Metrics**.

100a. If yes, will they provide the agency with a copy of their process and plans to enable it to determine if they are sufficient?

Microsoft will not share details of its security incident plans and processes with customers, as doing so could compromise the security of Microsoft Azure. Microsoft does recommend that customers review the online information we provide entitled "Securing the Cloud Infrastructure".

101. Does the service provider test and refine its incident response and management process and plans on a regular basis?

Yes. See answer to question 100. Customers may also be interested in reading the document entitled "Microsoft Enterprise Cloud Red Teaming".

102. Does the service provider engage its customers when testing its incident response and management processes and plans?

Microsoft approaches the testing of incident response plans with the aim of avoiding customer impact. If impact on a customer is anticipated, then normal support and communication processes would be engaged.

103. Does the service provider provide its staff with appropriate training on incident response and management processes and plans to ensure that they respond to incidents in an effective and efficient manner?

Yes. Customers are advised to refer to the information about training and awareness that is included in the document entitled "Microsoft Azure Standard Response to RFI - Security and Privacy"

104. Does the service provider's Terms of Service or SLA clearly define the support they will provide to the agency should an information security incident arise?

Yes - see answer to question 26 above.

For example, does the service provider:

104a. Notify customers when an incident that may affect the security of their information or interconnected systems is detected or reported?

Yes - see answer to question 26 above.

104b. Specify a point of contact and channel for customers to report suspected information security incidents?

To report security issues 24X7, customers can contact Microsoft Online Services Security Incident and Abuse Reporting

104c. Define the roles and responsibilities of each party during an information security incident?

See answer to question 26 above. In addition, with regard to the role of customers the Microsoft Online Service terms (OST) states: "Notification(s) of Security Incidents will be delivered to one or more of Customer's administrators by any means Microsoft selects, including via email. It is Customer's sole responsibility to ensure Customer's administrators maintain accurate contact information on each applicable Online Services portal. Microsoft's obligation to report or respond to a Security Incident under this section is not an acknowledgement by Microsoft of any fault or liability with respect to the Security Incident.

Customer must notify Microsoft promptly about any possible misuse of its accounts or authentication credentials or any security incident related to an Online Service."

104d. Provide customers with access to evidence (e.g. time stamped audit logs and/or forensic snapshots of virtual machines etc.) to enable them to perform their own investigation of the incident?

Azure offers an infrastructure service which provides customers with extensive access to their own virtual machines, including the ability to maintain logs within those machines. Microsoft cannot provide customers with access to shared components of the service that may contain other customers' data, but Microsoft will provide "detailed information about the security" incident as detailed in the answer to question 26 above.

104e. Provide sufficient information to enable the agency to cooperate effectively with an investigation by a regulatory body, such as the Privacy Commissioner or the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC)?

Microsoft provides customers detailed information about security incidents as set forth in question 26 above. Customers should note that this question could only be answered definitively *ex post*, on a case-by-case basis.

Also, please note that Microsoft Azure has PCI certification, as detailed in the compliance section of the Azure Trust Center.

104f. Define which party is responsible for the recovery of data and services after an information security incident has occurred?

This responsibility varies depending on the services adopted and the nature of the security incident. In the event of a disruption to Virtual Machines (IaaS), Microsoft's responsibility is to the restoration of access to the Azure service; the Customer is responsible for restoration of virtual machines and their applications. In the event of a disruption to Cloud Services (PaaS), Microsoft's responsibility is to the restoration of access to the Azure service, restoration of the application provisioned on one or more virtual machines.

104g. Share post incident reports with affected customers to enable them to understand the cause of the incident and make an informed decision about whether to continue using the cloud service?

See answer to questions 26 and 104d.

104h. Specify in the contract limits and provisions for insurance, liability and indemnity for information security incidents? (Note: it is recommended that agencies carefully review liability and indemnity clauses for exclusions.)?

Yes, Microsoft contracts specify the contract limits and provisions for insurance, liability and indemnity. Currently these terms are provided in the whole of government agreement (G2015).

105. Does the service provider's incident response and management procedures map to (or fit with) the agency internal policy and procedures; that does not hinder or delay the agency's ability to manage incidents in a timely and effective manner?

This question is for customers to answer.